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I. INTRODUCTION
To date, fifteen states have passed legislation regulating the
franchise relationship;' similar legislation has frequently been pro-
posed in Congress. 2 This deceptively simple and superficially ap-
pealing legislation seeks to regulate the franchise relationship by
prohibiting a franchisor from requiring "unreasonable" standards
of franchisee performance3 and from terminating or declining to re-
new a franchisee without "good cause."' Proponents of the legisla-
tion claim it is necessary to protect franchisees who otherwise
would continue to be victimized by franchisors. 5
Examination of the premises upon which existing and pro-
posed legislation regulating the franchise relationship is based
reveals serious misconceptions about the nature of the franchise re-
I Legislation imposing restrictions on a franchisor's right to terniinate or decline to re-
new a franchise according to the terms of the franchise agreement is referred to in this Arti-
cle as "legislation regulating the franchise relationship." Such laws currently in effect are
listed in note 202 infra, and are collected in the compilation of franchise laws published by
Commerce Clearing House in STATE BusINEsS FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE AND RELATIONSHIP LAWS
(CCH)(1978) [hereinafter cited as CCH], and in 1 G. GLICKMAN, FRANCHISING § 3.03, 4.02[7]
n.45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as G. GLICKMAN]; 2 G. GLICKMAN at § 13.03111].
2 See, e.g., H.R. 2305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as the Mikva
Bill]; H.R. 9144, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5016, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R.
8349, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2335, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2507, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967).
3 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7(e) (West Supp. 1979-1980); Mikva Bill, supra
note 2, § 3(3)(A).
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-133f(a) (1979); Mikva Bill § 5(2).
See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5016 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-
37 (1977) (statement of Rep. Mikva) [hereinafter cited as Mikva Bill Hearings]; id. at 64, 79
(statement of Harold Brown).
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lationship and the practices sought to be prohibited or controlled.
The thesis of this paper is that this legislation is the product of an
overreaction to a specific practice-overpromotion-once prevalent
in franchising but today largely eliminated. The subject legislation
not only poses a crippling threat to franchising as an effective
method of doing business but, more important, is being advanced
without due regard to its potentially adverse effects on our econ-
omy and legal system.
The first substantive part of this paper (Part II) is devoted to
an analysis of the nature of the franchise relationship and the two
principal forms franchising has taken: product and trade name
franchising and business format franchising. In Part III, the past
overpromotion of franchising is discussed, with particular focus on
the once prevalent abuse of misrepresentation by some franchisors,
and the resultant obscuring of the benefits of franchising.
Part IV of this paper consists of a compilation and analysis of
the available facts regarding the benefits of franchising, which fre-
quently run counter to many of the assumptions held by the propo-
nents of legislation regulating the franchise relationship. Part IV
demonstrates that, despite its problems, franchising significantly
benefits society, the franchisor, and the franchisee.
Part V of this paper discusses a critical issue in franchis-
ing-bargaining power between franchisor and franchisee. It is con-
cluded that proven franchisor abuses which may stem from a dis-
parity of bargaining power-misrepresentation, nondisclosure and
other forms of overpromotion-may be cured by requiring full and
fair disclosure by the franchisor, and that other franchisor abuses
which may occur are not widespread and are susceptible of correc-
tion by the enforcement of existing remedies.
Part VI examines the overreaction to the overpromotion of
franchising-existing and proposed legislation regulating the
franchise relationship. The unfortunate consequences of this legis-
lative overkill are set forth in Part VII.
Finally, Part VIII presents a balanced approach to the
problems existing in franchising-full and fair disclosure, the en-
forcement of existing remedies, remedial legislation where neces-
sary to correct specific, proven abuses, and the development and
maintenance of a healthy franchise relationship.
H. THE NATURE OF FRANCHISING
A. Definitional Problems
Sales of franchised goods and services are expected to reach
1980]
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$338 billion in 1980, an eighteen percent increase over 1978.6 De-
spite its clear importance to the economy, franchising is a fre-
quently misunderstood concept. There appears to be a common be-
lief that franchising is itself a business or industry, rather than a
way of doing business in many different industries. 7 Franchising is
not a business or industry;' it is only one of several different tech-
niques for achieving certain business goals by contractual agree-
ment rather than by vertical integration? Essentially, franchising
is a method of allocating costs and decisionmaking in a marketing
channel."°
It is difficult to formulate a definition of franchising suffi-
ciently broad to encompass all its various forms yet restrictive
enough to avoid including other ways of doing business.1 Typically
a U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1978-1980, at 1 (1980) [herein-
after cited as FRANCHISING-1980]. The Commerce Department publishes a comprehensive
annual analysis of statistics regarding franchising; the series is called "Franchising in the
Economy." The data reported by the Commerce Department is collected from nearly all
franchisors. Some data are not strictly comparable with earlier reported data due to revisions
in types of franchised business categories. Id. at vi.
7 See Burck, Franchising's Troubled Dream World, FORTUNE, Mar., 1970, at 116, 121;
McGuire, Franchising-Some Hurdles Ahead, CONF. BD. REC., July, 1970, at 54, 56; Thomp-
son, Franchising Operations and Antitrust Law, J. RETAILING 39 n.1 (Special Issue on
Franchising 1974).
8 See FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 1; Bennison, Franchising's Current Legal and
Regulatory Issues, RESTAURANT Bus., Mar., 1978, at 152; Fels, Legal Problems in Franchis-
ing-An Overview, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FRANCHISE 7, 9 (P.L.I. 1968); Ste-
phenson & House, A Perspective on Franchising, Bus. HomzoNs, Aug., 1971, at 35, 36. In-
deed, it has been suggested that the term "industry" should be reserved for categories of
businesses that the Department of Commerce lists as separate industries, e.g., fast food res-
taurants are segments of the fast food service industry. Vaughn, Growth and Future of the
Fast Food Industry, CORNELL HOTEL & REST. AD. Q., Nov., 1976, at 31, 32.
1 See Stephenson & House, supra note 8, at 35. Other methods include licensing, com-
missioning, jobbing, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1976-1978 at 21
(1978)[hereinafter cited as FRANCHISING-1978]; Bennison, supra note 8, at 152, wholesaler-
sponsored voluntaries and retailer-sponsored cooperatives, Stephenson & House, supra note
8, at 36.
See Stephenson & House, supra note 8, at 36.
See Axelrad, Franchising-Changing Legal Skirmish Lines or Armageddon?, 26 Bus.
LAw. 695, 696 (1971). Sample definitions of franchising include: "Franchising generally is
understood to contemplate a relationship wherein the franchisor provides the franchisee with
technical know-how and operating assistance on a continuing basis, while monitoring the
franchisee's operations so as to maintain the integrity of the franchisor's trademark (which
ordinarily is the keystone of a traditional franchising relationship)." Mikva Bill Hearings,
supra note 5, at 678 (statement of Lee Abrams). Franchising is "a continuing relationship in
which the franchisor provides a licensed privilege to do business, plus assistance in organiz-
ing, training, merchandising, and management in return for a consideration from the fran-
chisee." Swart & Carter, Negroes in Franchising, J. RErAILna 101 (Special Issue on
Franchising, 1974) (quoting the International Franchise Ass'n definition).
Franchising is a system of distributing goods and services that has three dis-
tinguishing characteristics: (1) one party (the franchisor) grants to another party
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characterized by a strong cooperative relationship between
franchisor and franchisee, franchising uses a voluntary contract as
a vehicle for obtaining centralized administration and control over
the marketing efforts of participants in a marketing channel.12
Franchising thus may be defined as a continuing contractual rela-
tionship in which the franchisor grants to the franchisee the right
to conduct business according to a marketing and operations plan
substantially prescribed by the franchisor, including the right to
use the franchisor's trademark or tradename in return for a con-
sideration from the franchisee.
The fundamental concept in franchising is that the franchisee
operates its business according to a marketing and operations plan
substantially prescribed by the franchisor, and thereby participates
in a uniform distribution system, identified by the franchisor's
trademark. The franchisor's trademark is valuable because it iden-
tifies for consumers the nature and quality of the goods sold or ser-
vices rendered by all franchisees operating under that trademark.
Consumer identification associated with the trademark can be
maintained only when the franchisor ensures that goods or services
are available and quality standards are adhered to uniformly
throughout the franchise system by enforcing franchisee conformity
to its marketing and operations plan. In order to enforce such con-
formity, the franchisor must retain substantial controls over the
franchisee's business."
Without franchisor controls, an individual franchisee would be
free to disregard the franchisor's marketing and operations plan by
deviating from the franchisor's product line or by allowing the
quality of its franchise to deteriorate. If it should do so, what econ-
omists call an externality problem would arise because the eco-
(the franchisee) the right to distribute or sell certain goods or services; (2) the
franchisee agrees to operate his business according to a marketing plan substan-
tially prescribed by the franchisor; and (3) the franchisee operates his business
substantially under a trademark or trade name owned by the franchisor.
Hunt & Nevin, Full Disclosure Laws in Franchising: An Empirical Investigation, J. MARKET-
ING, April, 1976, at 53. The FTC Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,619 (to be codified
in 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1980)) [hereinafter cited as FTC Rule], also includes a definition of
franchise as does the Mikva Bill, supra note 2, at § 3(2)(A). The various types of defini-
tions of "franchising" or "franchise" contained in state franchise statutes are discussed in
Note, Regulation of Franchising, 59 MINN. L. REv. 1027, 1037-42 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Regulations of Franchising].
12 See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 272-73 (statement of Philip F. Zeidman);
Stephenson & House, supra note 8, at 35-36.
1" Note, Constitutional Obstacles to State "Good Cause" Restrictions on Franchise Ter-
minations, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1487, 1499-1500 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional
Obstacles].
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nomic cost of such deviation would be spread over all the franchis-
ees and would scarcely be felt by the individual franchisee.-4 Of
course, generalized product line deviation from the marketing or
operations plan by many franchisees, acting independently, will in
the aggregate be felt by all, for the consumer identification associ-
ated with the franchisor's trademark would be lessened and the
value of the trademark correspondingly eroded.
Accordingly, all franchisees within a franchise system have a
vital interest in having the franchisor police each individual fran-
chisee's adherence to the franchisor's marketing and operations
plan in order to protect the trademark. Only the franchisor is in a
position to take prompt enough steps to prevent erosion of trade-
mark value because the short-term benefits of deviation from the
marketing and operations plan,, absent policing, ordinarily would
overcome an individual franchisee's incentive to prevent long-term
trademark erosion.
Franchising therefore depends on the voluntary agreement by
each franchisee to relinquish to the franchisor a certain amount of
its freedom of action in order to obtain the benefits of a uniform
system. The agreement is enforced by the franchisor for the benefit
of all the franchisees by the franchisor's exercise of controls over
the franchisees' businesses. By enforcing this agreement, the cost of
any deviation from the marketing and operations plan by an indi-
vidual franchisee may be internalized to it.
B. Types of Franchising
Two principal types of franchising, each quite different from
the other, have developed: product and trade name franchising, de-
scribed as traditional franchising by the United States Department
of Commerce,' 5 and business format franchising, sometimes called
enterprise franchising.'" Product and trade name franchising con-
sists primarily of product distribution arrangements in which a dis-
tributor (franchisee) is to some degree identified with the supplies
of a manufacturer (franchisor) .17 Typical of this segment of
franchising are automobile, truck, farm implement, tire and bicy-
cle dealers, gasoline service stations (manufacturer-retailer fran-
" See Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21
J.L. & ECON. 223, 227-28 (1978).
IS FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 1.
Id. at 3; Ray, Current Franchising Problems: A Rollback of Caveat Emptor, 8 AM.
Bus. L.J. 231, 232 (1971).
1" FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 1.
[Vol. 54:217
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chising), and soft drink bottlers and beer distributors (manufac-
turer-wholesaler franchising). Contrary to an apparently popular
impression, product and trade name franchising dominates
franchising, currently accounting for almost seventy-seven percent
of all franchise sales. 8
In business format or enterprise franchising, the type of
franchising that is perhaps most familiar to the public, 9 the
franchisor licenses a franchisee to operate an entire retail business
under the franchisor's trademark or trade name according to a
marketing and operations plan substantially prescribed by the
franchisor.0 Volume food retailers, automobile parts and drug
stores (wholesaler-retailer franchising), hotels and motels, fast food
restaurants, and business services systems (service sponsor-retailer
franchising) are examples of business format or enterprise
franchising.
Franchising spans a broad range of industries: at least forty
according to the Commerce Department.21 Critical elements of
the franchise relationship, such as the extent of the franchisor's
controls over the franchisee's business, the franchisor's and fran-
chisee's required initial investments, the franchised area of opera-
tions, the duration of the agreement, and the franchisor's compen-
sation, are not the same throughout franchising. Instead, they vary
according to the terms of the franchise agreement from industry to
industry and from franchise system to franchise system.
Most important, perhaps, is the fundamental difference be-
tween product and trade name franchising and the many forms of
business format franchising. In product and trade name franchis-
ing, the product sold by the franchisees usually is manufactured
by the franchisor and thus is uniform throughout the system. Some
forms of wholesaler-retailer franchising excepted, ordinarily there
is no such inherent uniformity present in business format franchis-
ing. Consequently, the .business format franchisor must retain sub-
stantial controls over the franchisees to ensure uniform quality
" Id.
" See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING iN THE ECONOMY 1974-1976 at 28 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as FRIANCMSING-1976]; Franchising-A Boom Unabated, FuANcsi WORLD,
Sept. 10, 1969, at 11. Business format franchisors include such well-known companies as
McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Burger King, Southland Corporation (7-Eleven
Stores), and H. & R. Block.
See Hunt & Nevin, supra note 11, at 53; Ray, supra note 16, at 232.
21 U.S. DEPAIRMENT OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1977-1979, at 9 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as FRANCHISING-1979].
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throughout the system. Although franchisor controls are necessary
in many forms of product and trade name franchising to ensure
uniform quality of service and the like, in contrast to business for-
mat franchising, a product and trade name franchisor ordinarily
requires fewer and less substantial controls over the franchisees to
maintain uniform quality.2
Viewing franchising as an industry or business rather than a
way of doing business in many different industries reinforces the
misconception that the franchising "industry" can be regulated by
broad, all-encompassing legislation. FTC Commissioner Paul Rand
Dixon has pointed out the impracticality of this notion: "The many
varieties of franchise systems differ among themselves so widely
that any attempt to state rules applicable to all franchise systems
must either be so broad as to approach the meaningless or tailored
with numerous qualifications in order to fit all varieties of
franchises. ' 23 Once it is recognized that franchising is not an indus-
try or business but a way of doing business in many different in-
dustries, the impracticality of "industry"-wide legislation regulat-
ing the franchising relationship becomes apparent.
The misconception that franchising is itself a business rather
than a way of doing business was probably granted and undoubt-
edly encouraged as a result of the practices of highly publicized,
aggressive entrepreneurs whose businesses seemed to consist of lit-
tle more than selling franchises and rights to subfranchise. This
sort of activity was hardly franchising, but, as a result of the noto-
riety given such practices, franchising may have come to be viewed
by the public as a business itself-the business of selling
franchises.
n See generally id. at 28; Thompson, supra note 7, at 50. State and federal regulators
have recognized that product and trade name franchising differs fundamentally from busi-
ness format franchising. Many states have passed relationship legislation pertaining to auto-
mobile dealerships, gasoline service stations, beer distributorships, and farm implement
dealerships. These statutes are collected in CCH, supra note 1. On the federal level, Con-
gress has passed legislation regulating the franchise relationship in such industries as auto-
mobile dealerships, Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976),
and gasoline service stations; Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806,
2821-2824, 2841 (Supp. II 1978).
,3 Axelrad, supra note 11, at 712 n.41.
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II. THE OVERPROMOTION OF FRANCHISING: EXAGGERATED PROMISES
AND UNREALIZED EXPECTATIONS
The franchise "boom" of the 1960's-early 1970's 4 was caused
in part by some franchise promotors' exaggerated promises to pro-
spective franchisees of instant financial success without need of
prior business experience, of total independence and, sometimes, of
association with a glamorous celebrity.2s A kind of euphoria was
encouraged by numerous rags-to-riches stories in the business and
consumer press28 and by the prices of some franchisors' securities
being bid up to unrealistic heights.Y
According to a 1971 report on fast food franchising prepared
for the Senate Select Committee on Small Business by Professors
Urban B. Ozanne and Shelby D. Hunt of the Graduate School of
Business of the University of Wisconsin (the Ozanne-Hunt re-
port),2 over thirty-seven percent of the responding franchisees
stated that their franchisors had overestimated potential profits
during the prepurchase negotiations, while only 6.5% reported an
underestimation." (It is noteworthy that a majority of the franchis-
ees reported an inaccurate estimation.)30
Ozanne and Hunt reported that in many cases, prospective
franchisees were not shown profit and loss statements representa-
tive of the system's franchises, but were given only pro forma state-
ments reflecting unrealistic profit estimates. (The majority of re-
sponding franchisees, however, reported that they were presented
with actual profit and loss statements prior to signing.) 32 It was also
2, See H. KURSH, THE FRANCHISE BooM (rev. ed. 1968); Axelrad, supra note 11, at 695;
Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DUKE
L.J. 465, 466 n.1; Murray, The Cautious Boom in Franchising, DUN'S REv., Nov., 1972, at
45-46.
21 See FRANCHISING-1979, supra note 21, at 20; Axelrad, supra note 11, at 705-06; Elliot,
Speculative Bellyache?, BARRON'S, Aug. 25, 1969, at 3; Hunt, The Socioeconomic Conse-
quences of the Franchise System of Distribution, J. MARKETING, July, 1972, at 32, 37; Hunt
& Nevin, supra note 11, at 54; Murray, supra note 24, at 46.
u See Axelrad, supra note 11, at 704; Hunt, supra note 25, at 37.
" See Axelrad, supra note 11, at 704; Burck, supra note 7, at 118.
23 SENATE SELECT Comm. ON SMALL BusINEsS, 92D CONG., 1ST SEss., THE ECONoMIc EF-
FECTS OF FRANCHISING (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as OZANNE & HUNT]. Ozanne
and Hunt studied franchising as used in three industries: fast food, laundry-dry cleaning,
and convenience groceries. Id. at 257, 284, 290. While the study is comprehensive and gener-
ally well done, because of franchising's dynamic development since 1971 many of the trends
reported are no longer evident. In addition, in some instances the study's findings do not
support the authors' conclusions.
2 Id. at 121-22.
3 Id. at 122.
31 Id. at 142.
22 Id. at 121. 84.6% of the responding franchisors stated that they showed actual profit
19801
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found that over seventy-two percent of the franchisees earned less
than the minimum which would naturally be expected on the basis
of their franchisors' pro forma income statements, over ninety per-
cent earned less than the average income expected, and over
ninety-eight percent earned less than the maximum income ex-
pected.31 Ozanne and Hunt concluded from these figures that a
large number of fast food franchisors were misleading potential
franchisees on the potential profitability of their franchises. 4
Similarly, the Ozanne-Hunt report concluded that fast food
franchisors were also misleading potential franchisees about the po-
tential sales volume of their franchises.3 5 This conclusion was based
upon a finding that almost seventy percent of the responding fran-
chisees failed to reach the minimum sales figure which would natu-
rally be expected on the basis of their franchisors' pro forma state-
ments, that almost eighty-seven percent failed to achieve the
average sales expected, and that ninety-eight percent failed to
reach the maximum sales expected.
Misrepresentation of the degree of autonomy enjoyed by fran-
chisees was also prevalent during the franchise boom. 7 In many
cases, prospective franchisees were persuaded by franchisor sales
talk that as franchisees, they would be almost totally independent
businessmen. Some franchisors, either through ignorance or by de-
sign, inadequately informed prospective franchisees about the ex-
tent of franchisor controls over their businesses necessary to
achieve uniformity throughout the franchise system."
Some promoters of franchising, with little more than hope and
an untested idea, sought to attain instant consumer identification
and allure by associating their franchise systems with prominent
celebrities, notably from the sports and entertainment worlds.39
These promoters and prospective franchisees alike assumed that a
celebrity's association with the franchise system would generate
and loss statements to prospective franchisees. Id.
Id. at 143.
u Id. at 142.
35 Id. at 145-46.
u Id.
37 See FTC Rule, supra note 11, at 59,626; Burck, supra note 7, at 120.
3 See FTC Rule, supra note 11, at 59,626.
31 See note 25 supra. Examples of celebrity-promoted franchises include: Broadway
Joe's (Joe Namath); Al Hirt's Sandwich Saloons; Dizzy Dean's Beef & Burger; Mickey Man-
tle's Country Cookin' Restaurants; James Brown's Gold Platter Pantries; Tony Bennett Spa-
ghetti Houses; Johnny's America Inns (Johnny Carson); and Mahalia Jackson's Glori-Fried
Chicken System. Elliot, supra note 25, at 3.
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consumer patronage." While often depicted as active managers of
the franchise operation, many celebrities lent little more than their
names and whatever attendant glitter.4
One relatively common practice during the franchise boom
contributed to the ballooning prices of franchisor securities and the
general euphoria surrounding franchising: accounting for franchise
fees as current net income even though the franchise agreement
provided for payment over a term of several years.4" Franchisors
using this practice were forced to concentrate heavily on selling
franchises in order to keep profit figures rising; overpromotion nat-
urally resulted. 3
As stated by the Small Business Reporter, the overpromotion
of franchising, "even though attributable to perhaps a small num-
ber of franchisors, account[s] for much of the franchise disappoint-
ment and bitterness, official censure and bad press that has hurt
franchising in general."" Overpromotion not only generated unreal-
istic franchise expectations fated for unfulfillment but also ob-
scured the real benefits of franchising. It has become almost impos-
sible to separate fact from fiction about franchising. Accordingly,
before examining the reaction to the overpromotion of franchising,
it is necessary to analyze critically the franchise method of doing
business to determine, as accurately as possible, the true extent of
its benefits to society, the franchisor, and the franchisee. Following
this analysis, much of the reaction may be seen for what it is: an
overreaction to the overpromotion of franchising.
See Axelrad, supra note 11, at 705.
" The use by franchisors of a celebrity name enabled them to sell franchises and to go
public but failed to induce the necessary consumer patronage. Axelrad, supra note 11, at
705. By 1972, use of a celebrity to promote franchises had diminished and many of those
franchising systems that had used celebrity promotions found themselves in financial
trouble. Hunt, supra note 25, at 38.
" See A Business of Your Own?, ECONOMIST, May 2, 1976, at 52; Coyle, Wall Street:
Part Bull, Part Bear, All Eyes, VOLUME FEEDING MANAGEMENT, Jan., 1970, at 31, 32; Elliott,
Chicken Delight?, BARRON'S, Sept. 29, 1969, at 5, 16, 18; Restaurant Franchisers Under Fire,
FINANCIAL WORLD, Mar. 11, 1970, at 7.
3 See Coyle, supra note 42, at 32.
" SMAL Bus. REP., FRANcmsINo 9 (1970); see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN
THE ECONOMY 1973-1975, at 13 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FRANCmSING-1975].
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IV. THE BENEFITS OF FRANCHISING
A. The Benefits of Franchising to Society
1. The Creation of Small, Independently Owned Businesses
The available evidence indicates that franchising substantially
encourages the creation of relatively small, independently owned
businesses45 and therefore contributes to decreased economic con-
centration in the channels of distribution. Indeed, franchising is
perhaps the only way of doing business that by its very nature con-
tributes to the creation of new business units.46 The 1971 Ozanne-
Hunt report concluded that fast food franchising alone was respon-
sible for the creation of between 13,700 and 25,800 small, indepen-
dently owned businesses."
This benefit is not merely transitory." While there may have
'5 National policy in this country favors small, independently owned businesses. See 15
U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976). Commentators have viewed with increasing concern the replacement
of small, independently owned businesses by large, vertically integrated corporate chains,
especially in the channels of distribution, and the consequent increase in economic concen-
tration. E.g., Hunt, Franchising: Promises, Problems, Prospects, J. RETAILING, Fall 1977, at
71-72; Ray, supra note 16, at 233.
,' FRANCHSINO-1980, supra note 6, at 1; Mikva, Franchise Reform Will Protect Small
Business, FoOD SERVICE MARKETING, Aug., 1978, at 28. Franchising's contribution to the crea-
tion of independently owned businesses was noted in Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp.
636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965): "The franchise system creates a class of independent business-
men; it provides the public with an opportunity to get a uniform product at numerous points
of sale from small independent contractors, rather than from employees of a vast chain."
Id. at 640.
The 1971 Ozanne-Hunt study of fast food franchising supports these observations, pro-
viding several estimates of the net effect of fast food franchising on the creation .of new
businesses. OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 37-38, 114. About 68% of the responding fran-
chisees were not self-employed in their last prior employment, thus suggesting fast food
franchising's maximum contribution to the establishment of independently owned busi-
nesses. Id. at 37-38.
47 OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 114. Although the Commerce Department has re-
ported a trend toward multi-unit ownership, see text accompanying note 111 infra, most
franchisees are small businessmen when compared to large, vertically integrated chains.
Some franchised outlets, however, may be created at the expense of completely independent
businesses. See Elliott, supra note 25, at 18; Ray, supra note 16, at 234.
11 It has been rather uncertainly hypothesized by Professors Oxenfeldt and Kelly that
franchising is but a temporary method of doing business used to raise sufficient capital to
form completely integrated corporate chains; according to them, franchise systems will ulti-
mately become vertically integrated chains. Oxenfeldt & Kelly, Will- Successful Franchise
Systems Ultimately Become Wholly-Owned Chains?, J. RETAILING 69 (Special Issue on
Franchising 1974). Oxenfeldt and Kelly had found that insufficient data then existed to
discern reliable trends on company ownership. Id. at 83. Therefore, according to Oxenfeldt
and Kelly, the benefits of franchising to society are short term only. Id. This theory gained
some support when it became known that several well-known fast food franchisors had be-
gun to repurchase profitable franchised units. See, e.g., Burck, supra note 7, at 121 (McDon-
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existed a trend in some industries involved in franchising to ex-
pand company-owned units49 or to repurchase franchised units and
operate them as company-owned outlets,"0 this trend peaked in
ald's); Franchising-A Boom Unabated, FINANCIAL WORLD, Sept. 10, 1969, at 11 (Chock Full
0' Nuts); Sherwood, supra, at 32-33 (Howard Johnson and Kentucky Fried Chicken). Propo-
nents of legislation regulating the franchise relationship have contended that franchisor ter-
minations and nonrenewals are largely motivated by a desire to convert their operations
from franchises to company-owned units. See Mikva bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 62
(statement of Harold Brown); Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L.
REv. 650, 659 (1971). See also Franchising-A Boon Unabated, FINANCIAL WORLD, Sept. 10,
1969, at 11; Ray, supra note 16, at 243. As discussed in note 49, infra, available data demon-
strate the invalidity of the Oxenfeldt-Kelly hypothesis.
11 Company-owned units may be attractive to some franchisors for a number of reasons.
In some industries, company-owned units tend to be more .profitable and provide a greater
return to the franchisor than franchised units. See Burck, supra note 7, at 121; Elliott, More
Mouths to Feed, BARRON'S, Sept. 15, 1969, at 25-26; Hunt, The Trend Toward Company-
Operated Units in Franchise Chains, J. RETAILING, Summer 1973, at 36 [hereinafter cited
as Hunt-1973]; Axelrad, supra note 11, at 718 n.57; cf. FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 81
(comparison of average sales per establishment).
Moreover, company ownership makes possible a greater degree of inanagement control
over unit operations than is available over franchised units. See Axelrad, supra note 11, at
718 n.57; Hunt-1973, supra, at 7; Hunt, supra note 45, at 74. Finally, the legal difficulties
associated with maintaining a franchise system comprised of semi-autonomous participants
may encourage franchisors to establish company-owned units. Hunt, supra note 45, at 74; cf.
FRANcHISING-1976, supra note 19, at 24 (costlier and more complicated in franchising due to
multitude of state franchising laws).
On the other hand, there exist powerful disincentives to the creation of company-owned
units. The capital and administrative requirements for establishing and operating a wholly-
owned chain can be prohibitive for even very large franchisors. Hunt-1973, supra, at 4-5;
Sherwood, Franchising: Big Business Cashes In On the American Dream, Bus. MANAGEMENT,
Aug., 1968, at 33. In many industries, company-owned units are economically feasible only in
relatively concentrated markets; often, more isolated marketing areas are not suitable for
company-owned outlets. Hunt-1973, supra, at 5, 11. Finally, and most importantly, the
otherwise unattainable benefit of local, highly motivated owner-operators strongly favors
franchised outlets. Id. at 4; Convenience Store Franchising: How It Works, How (For Some)
It Doesn't, PROGRESSIVE GROcER, Nov., 1971, at 90, 93-94 [hereinafter cited as Convenience
Store Franchising]; cf. Glaser, The Chain That Makes Managers Partners, DRUG TopIcs,
Sept. 1, 1978, at 50.
In the late 1960's-early 1970's a trend existed in fast food franchising toward ex-
panding company-owned units. For example, in 1971, Ozanne and Hunt reported that in fast
food franchising, the percentage of company-owned units had risen from 6.6% in 1968 to
an estimated 11.3% in 1971. OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 80. It was estimated
that in 1969, 360 franchised units were converted to company ownership by fast food
franchisors and 150 company-operated units were converted to franchise operation, yielding
a net change from franchised to company-owned units of 210 units. Id. at 81-82. Although
considerable attention had been given to franchisor "buy-backs" or repurchases of
franchises, Ozanne and Hunt recognized that most of the actual expansion of company-
owned units in fast food franchising was by new construction. Repurchases of franchised
units accounted for only about 30% of the increase in company owned units in 1969; new
construction generated about 70% of the increase. Id.
During the period from 1969 to 1971, in all franchising, the percentage of company-
owned units decreased from 17.9% of the total number of units to 17.3%, whereas in fast food
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1975,5' and today the percentage of company-owned outlets has
largely stabilized at about nineteen percent for all franchising and
twenty-eight percent for fast food franchising. 52
franchising, the percentage of company-owned units increased from 13.4% of the total num-
ber of units to 18.1%. FRANCHISING-1978, supra note 9, at 34. Commerce Department figures
for 1971 also indicated the existence of a shift to company-owned units, predominantly in
fast food restaurants and food retailing. In 1971, 1,755 franchised establishments were repur-
chased for company operations and 602 company-owned establishments were converted to
franchise ownership. FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 9. The Commerce Department
noted, however, that such "arrangement" changes-"those converting to franchisee-owned
or company-owned operations"-were relatively small, accounting for less than 1% of the
number of establishments. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1971-1973,
at xv (1973).
A trend in fast food franchising toward expanding company-owned units was thus iso-
lated, and was later reaffirmed by Hunt in 1972, Hunt, supra note 25, at 34, in 1973, Hunt-
1973, supra, at 11, and, somewhat more guardedly, in 1977, Hunt, supra note 45, at 80. The
empirical evidence developed by the 1971 Ozanne-Hunt study of fast food franchising was
used by Hunt in 1973 in an attempt to support the Oxenfeld-Kelly hypothesis regarding
franchising generally. Hunt-1973, supra, at 3.
11 Commerce Department data for 1972.1975 indicated a slowing of the shift to com-
pany-owned units. During the period from 1972-1975, in all franchising, the percentage of
company-owned units increased from 17.4% of the total number of units to 18.5%, whereas
in fast food franchising, the percentage of company-owned units increased from 19.4% of the
total number of units to 27.2%. FRANCHISING-1978, supra note 9, at 35-36.
The Commerce Department reported that those "outlets repurchased for company own-
ership were mostly temporary buy-backs for a multitude of reasons, the least of which was
the company's desire to buy these back in order to withdraw from the franchise system."
FRANCHISING-1976, supra note 19, at 17; see FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 9. Commerce
Department data'also demonstrated that the shift toward expanding company-owned opera-
tions did not occur in franchising generally but was concentrated largely in fast food
franchising.
52 More recent Commerce Department data tend to show that any trend toward ex-
panding company-owned operations has ended, both in all franchising and in fast food
franchising. In all franchising in 1976, the percentage of company-owned units increased
0.3% to 18.8%. FRANCHISING-1978, supra note 9, at 36. In 1977, the percentage of company-
owned units increased 0.3'b to 19.1%. FRANCHISING-1979, supra note 6, at 40. In 1978, the
percentage of company-owned units declined slightly to 18.8%. FRANCtusING-1980, supra note
6, at 69. The percentage of company-owned units in all franchising is estimated to have
declined in 1979 to 18.5%, and to decline again to 18.2% in 1980. Id. at 70-71.
Similarly, in fast food franchising in 1976, the percentage of company-owned units de-
clined 0.4'v to 26.8' o. FRANCHISING-1978, supra note 9, at 36. The percentage of company-
owned units in fast food franchising increased to 27.9% in 1977, FRANCHiSING-1979, supra
note 21, at 40, increased slightly to 28% in 1978, is estimated to have remained at 28% in
1979, and to decline slightly to 27.8% in 1980. FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 69-71 ("res-
taurants-all types").
Commerce Department data for all franchising in 1976-1977 also indicate a reversal in
the practice of repurchasing franchised units for company operation. In all franchising in
1976-1978, franchisors converted 546, 619 and 612 franchised units, respectively, to company
operation, and 956, 839 and 718 company-operated units were converted to franchisee opera-
tion, leaving a net change from company-operated to franchised units of 410 units in 1976
and 220 in 1977; and 106 in 1978. FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 9. The latest figures for
fast food franchising confirm that any movement to repurchase franchised outlets seems to
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2. The Failure Rate of Franchised Businesses
Business failures sap the vitality of the econofhy by wasting
resources and causing economic disruption. The principal reasons
of business failure are proprietor inexperience and lack of sufficient
capital. As discussed in Part IV.C.3 below, most franchisors provide
initial and continuing training and assistance to their franchisees,
thus enabling inexperienced businessmen to compete in the
marketplace. Many franchisors also provide capital assistance to
franchisees with insufficient capital resources of their own, and to
this extent, franchising helps to eliminate one of the principal causes
of business failure.5 3
have largely run its course, with perhaps a period of uncertainty most recently appearing. In
fast food franchising in 1976, 280 franchised units were repurchased for company ownership
and 413 units were converted to franchisee ownership, leaving a net change from company-
owned units to franchised units of 138 units. FRANCHISING-1979, supra note 21, at 13. The
trend continued in 1977: 305 units were repurchased for company ownership and 425 units
were converted to franchisee ownership, representing a net change from company-owned
units to franchised units of 120 units. Id. The figures for 1978 show that 321 units were
repurchased and 312 converted, representing a net change from franchised units to com-
pany-owned units of nine. FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at-14. High interest rates and the
unavailability of capital for expansion appear to influence franchisors' decisions regarding
repurchasing. See FRANCHISING-1976, supra note 19, at 4.
A 1977 study by the Continental Franchise Review also supports the conclusion that any
trend toward expanding company-owned units has ended. See Franchisor Trends in Termi-
nations and Repurchase, 1977 CoNmrrAL FRANCHISE REv. 47-48 [hereinafter cited as
Franchisor Trends]. It was reported that the total number of franchises involved in repur-
chases represented "less than .4% of franchises in this sample of over 18,500, or approxi-
mately 74 franchises." Id. at 11. Most franchisors indicated that units were repurchased on
temporary basis and would be resold to franchisees. Id. at 30.
Interestingly, the Continental Franchise Review study also noted that in 73.3% of the
instances of repurchase, the franchisee desired to sell. Id. at 12. This is not surprising. Ordi-
narily, repurchases are made by mature, successful franchisors. Hunt-1973, supra note 49, at
9. Many franchisees, nearing the end of 10-, 15- or 20-year agreements with these mature
franchisors, have reached retirement age and desire to liquidate their investment. See Elli-
ott, More Mouths to Feed, BARRON'S, Sept. 15, 1969, at 5, 25-26.
A 1977 survey conducted by Hunt confirmed the existence of a new franchisor attitude
toward company-owned units, although, based upon the figures contained in the 1971
Ozanne-Hunt report regarding fast food franchising, Hunt continued to believe that the
trend was toward company-owned units. Hunt, supra note 45, at 80. The study indicated
that in every industry franchisors expected to increase or substantially increase their
franchised units and did not expect to expand their company-owned units as fast as their
franchised units. Id. at 79, 81. The study reported that, on the average, 91% of respondents
expected either to "substantially increase" or "increase" franchised units, while only 58%
expected "substantially [to] increase" or "increase" company-operated units. Id. at 81.
Data collected by the International Franchise Association (IFA) in states where, as part
of their registration statements, franchisors must provide statistics respecting acquisitions
also indicate that the trend toward expanding company-owned units has abated. Mikva bill
Hearings, supra note 5, at 344-45 (statement of Philip F. Zeidman). The IFA's survey in
Michigan covered a total of 34,419 franchised outlets and revealed that during the period
from 1974 to 1976 only 2,095 or 6.1% of these franchised units were reacquired by franchisors,
about 2 per year. Id. at 344. In Wisconsin, where the survey covered 12,474 franchised
outlets, 696 or 5.6', of these units were reacquired, about 1.9% per year. Id. at 345.
See Bernstein, Does Franchising Create a Secure Outlet for the Small Aspiring Entre-
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As a matter of a priori reasoning it would appear that
franchised businesses should experience a lower failure rate than
completely independent businesses, 4 because an individual fran-
chisee's risk of failure should be reduced by his participation in a
well-run franchise system in which the franchisor provides manage-
rial training and a tested marketing and operations plan.15 The
available empirical evidence is, however, inconclusive.56 The 1971
Ozanne-Hunt study indicated that the actual fast food franchise
failure rate was between 1.3% and 7.1% in 1968, and between 1.3%
and 6.7% in 1969. 51 Others have estimated that ten percent of all
preneur?, J. RETAILING 21, 28-29 (Special Issue on Franchising 1974). As reported by Bern-
stein, the intensive selection process used by most franchisors is designed to screen potential
franchisees on the basis of personality, interest, aptitude, and ability, with consideration
given to the needs of the particular business. Franchisors use detailed questionnaires, inter-
views, and visits to existing facilities in the selection process. Id. at 26-27. See Tatham,
Douglass & Bush, An Analysis of Decision Criteria in Franchisor/Franchisee Selection
Processes, J. RETAILING 84, 88 (Secial Issue on Franchising 1974)- [hereinafter cited as Deci-
sion Criteria].
11 Bernstein, supra note 53, at 34; see Hanford, Problems and Financing Trends in
Franchising, APPRAISAL J., Apr. 1971, at 222, 224. In 1969, it was reported that while the
small business failure rate was 60%, franchisees suffer only a 10% failure rate and franchisors
a 11( failure rate. "Caveat Emptor" Keyword of the Franchising Boom, PUBLISHERS'
WEEKLY, Aug. 18, 1969, at 49 (citing Dun & Bradstreet statistics). But see OZANNE & HUNT,
supra note 28, at 97. The 10% failure rate for franchised businesses was also reported in a
study undertaken by students at the Harvard Business School. So You Want to Run a
Franchise?, DUN's REv., Jan., 1969, at 36,37. See also Oxenfeldt & Thompson, Franchising in
Perspective, J. RETAILING 3, 6 (Special Issue on Franchising 1974).
Bernstein, supra note 53, at 28-33; see FRANCHISING-1979, supra note 6, at 1.
Reliable statistics do not exist regarding the failure rate of franchised businesses.
Hunt, supra note 25, at 33-34; Hunt, supra note 45, at 75. Commerce Department figures
indicate that in 1978, 8,690 establishments or 3.5% of the total number of the 245,694 estab-
lishments for which such data were collected experienced a "change in ownership", a cate-
gory comprised of repurchases for company ownership, conversions to franchisee ownership,
and discontinuances of franchised businesses. FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 69, 84.
Data regarding outlets repurchased by franchisors and resold to new franchisees and
franchised outlets sold directly by franchisors and resold to new franchisees are not included in
the changes in ownership category.
Of the 8,690 changes of ownership in 1978, 7,360 establishments or 3% of the total num-
ber of establishments discontinued operations. Id. It may be fair to assume that nearly all
discontinued franchised establishments represented failed units. See OZANNE & HUNT, supra
note 28, at 94. In fast food franchising, 2,028 establishments or 3.7% of the total number of
franchised establishments for which such data were collected experienced a change in
ownership in 1978; 1,395 franchised establishments or 2.5% discontinued operation.
FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 69, 84.
However, without knowing the total number of changes in ownership or the percentage
of that total representing failed units, calculation of the actual failure rate of franchised
businesses is impossible. The 3% and 2.5% establishment franchise discontinuance figures
for all franchising and fast food franchising, respectively, represent only the low end of the
possible range for franchising's failure rate in 1978.
" OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 34-35.
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franchises fail.-"
3. Franchising's Contribution to Increased Economic Opportuni-
ties for Minority Group Members
Many franchised businesses require only minimal entry capital
and experience in business and management on the part of the pro-
spective franchisee. Lack of sufficient capital and inexperience are
major obstacles facing small entrepreneurs, including minority
group members, and thus franchising would appear to provide a
medium for assisting minority group members to overcome these
deficiencies and own their own businesses.
Beginning in the 1960's, the federal government, attempting to
apply traditional principles to the economic problems of minority
group members, sought to foster what became known as "black
capitalism."59 Franchising, with its relatively low entry barriers,
was assigned a major role in this effort to assist minority groups."0
Many franchise systems developed special programs to aid minor-
ity group members to enter franchising.' By 1976, at least thirty-
six franchisors had developed special programs to encourage minor-
ity group ownership of franchises."
' See note 54 supra.
' Especially during the Nixon Administration, the federal government sought to ame-
liorate poverty problems by encouraging ownership of businesses by minorities. An Office of
Minority Business Enterprise was created in the Department of Commerce. In addition, the
Small Business Administration fostered the idea that franchising was a means for getting
blacks and other minorities into roles as small businessmen. A Business of Your Own?,
ECONOMIST, May 2, 1976, at 52.
'Id.
, Id. (McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., and International Industries). See
also Hunt, supra note 45, at 75.
" FRANCHISING-1976, supra note 19, at 19. For example, McDonald's facilitated minority
group member's entry into franchising by reducing its usual entry capital requirement. In-
ternational Industries developed the "Two Plus You" program; the minority group member
was required to make a 2'b downpayment plus an emotional commitment in return for a
franchise to be granted after successful completion of a specialized 6 months to 1 year
apprenticeship program. OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 185-86. A joint venture known as
"Brady Keys" Kentucky Fried Chicken was begun by All-Pro Chicken, a black-owned
franchise system started by Brady Keys and Kentucky Fried Chicken. See Burck, supra note
7, at 150; Blacks Get Boost in Trucking, Fast Food Franchising, COMMERCE TODAY, Sept. 20,
1971, at 22.
The Office of Minority Business Enterprise of the Department of Commerce and the
Small Business Administration initiated a project in 1969, popularly known as the
"25x25x2" plan, aimed at recruiting minority group members chiefly through the efforts of
franchisors. See Washington: Are Controls in the Works?, VOLUME FEEDING MANAGEMENT,
Jan., 1970, at 34, 36. The intent of the program was to bring groups of 25 franchisors to eight
Washington conferences designed to work out plans whereby each of the participating
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Although many of these programs proved quite successful in
recruiting franchisees from minority groups, the percentage of mi-
nority franchisees remained relatively low. A 1972 study of black
franchise ownership during 1966-1969 reported that less than one
percent of all franchises were owned by blacks. 3 The 1971 Ozanne-
Hunt study indicated that at the end of 1970, minority businessmen
held at most a 2.9% and possibly as low as 1.5% share of the fast food
franchises then existing. 4 More recent data indicate that minority
participation in business format franchising has expanded. Data
collected by the Commerce Department shows that minority group
members' participation in franchising increased by over twenty-
three percent in 1978. Of the 1,394 franchisors surveyed, 441 reported
a total of 5,859 units owned by minority group members, or
approximately four percent of the franchisee-owned establishments
in responding franchise systems.65
Many minority group members have thus become notably suc-
cessful franchisees, due primarily to special franchisor recruiting
and training programs. Absent these programs, however, increased
opportunities for minority group members would seem a difficult
goal to attain.
B. The Benefits of Franchising to the Franchisor
Franchising's continued growth as a way of doing business is
perhaps the most eloquent testimony to its benefits to the
franchisor. In 1969, there were 315,045 franchisee-owned establish-
ments.6 By 1978, franchisee-owned establishments rose to 366,923,
1
franchisors would open up.at least 25 minority-owned franchises within the succeeding 2
years. The SBA also granted loans to minority franchisees. Id. In fiscal 1971, the Commerce
Department expected to make a portion of up to $301 million in federal grants, loans, and
guarantees available to minority franchisees. See also F1ANcmsING-1979, supra note 21, at 8.
6 Swart & Carter, supra note 11, at 104-05. The study also reported a significantly
higher failure rate for black operators (23.8%) as compared to white franchise operators
(5.11 ). Id. at 105-06. The sample size used was admittedly small. Id. The number of minority
franchisees is also a function of the low number of minority applicants for franchises. Swart &
Carter reported that in 1969, only 1.5% of all franchise applications came from non-whites. Id.
at 105.
"' OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 192-93. In 1975, Professor Andrew Brimmer con-
cluded that black participation in franchising appeared to be increasing and that it was
particularly promising for blacks, as franchisors sought to appeal to black clientele by locat-
ing in black neighborhoods. Brimmer, The Outlook for Black Business, BLAcK ENTERPMSE,
June, 1975, at 25, 160, col. 2.
11 FRANCISING-1980, supra note 6, at 8, 69.
61 Id. at 69, 75. The Department of Commerce estimates that the total number of estab-
lishments (franchisee and company owned) will increase from 451,790 in 1978 to an esti-
mated 488,292 in 1980, an increase of 8.1%. Franchise sales of goods and services are expected
to rise 18'( between 1978 and 1980. Of the 488,292 establishments estimated for 1980, it is
expected that 399,320 (821b) will be franchisee-owned. Id. at 71.
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an increase of 16.5%.17 As franchising has matured, the percentage
of franchisor failures has steadily declined."
1. Franchisor Capital Requirements
Low entry barriers make franchising a most attractive way of
doing business. 9 Unlike other methods of doing business, huge cap-
ital outlays are not required.70 Moreover, because of franchising's
low entry barriers, start-up costs may be quickly recovered.7'
Franchisors are also provided with the human and capital resources
necessary for rapid expansion and market penetration. 72 Rapid ex-
" Unit growth in franchisee-owned fast food establishments has been quite spectacular,
up from 24,894 franchised units in 1969 to 39,802 in 1977, id. at 69, 75, a 60% increase. As
noted earlier, franchisors report that they plan to expand their franchised operations. See
note 52 supra.
The benefits of franchising to the franchisor are also indicated by the number of acquisi-
tions of franchising companies by large, diversified companies. Such well known franchise
systems as Kentucky Fried Chicken, Burger King, Burger Chef, Pizza Hut, Baskin-Robbins,
A&W, and Dunhill Personnel System have been so acquired. See OZANNE & HUNT, supra
note 28, at 351-52; Burck, supra note 7, at 118.
0 The 1971 Ozanne-Hunt report identified 54 fast food franchise systems that failed
during 1969-1970, representing 6.7% of all fast food franchise systems existing during this
period. OZANNE & HuNT, supra note 28, at 34. In 1975, 55 franchisors with 3,148 establish-
ments failed, FRANCHISING-1976, supra note 19, at 24, and in 1976, 39 franchisors with 2,100
establishments failed. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1975-1977, at 19
(1977) [hereinafter cited as FRANCHISING-1977]. Twenty-four franchisors, accounting for 536
establishments, failed in 1977. FRANCHISING-1978, supra note 9, at 10. In 1978, 30
franchisors, operating 1,391 establishments, failed. FRANCHISING-1979, supra note 21, at 9. In
1979, 55 franchisors, accounting for 1,888 outlets, failed. FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at
9. These figures represented only a small fraction of franchise sales and operating units.
Compared to total franchising sales, the amount lost through franchisor failure is regarded
by the Commerce Department as of minimal importance. FRANCHISIN-1979, supra note 21,
at 10. Failure rates do not include those companies that opted to discontinue franchising as
a method of doing business. The number of such companies and their respective establish-
ments are relatively insignificant. Id. at 9.
Once prevalent fears of market saturation, see OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 31,
appear to have been somewhat exaggerated. See Chew, Fast-Food Expert Shoots Down
Over-Saturation Theory, ADVERTISING AGE, May 8, 1978, at 90. The Commerce Department
has reported that in 1978, fast food franchising experienced a net gain of 38 franchisors.
FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 13. Opportunities for new growth abound. A good exam-
ple of an expanding franchise system is Wendy's International, Inc., which grew from a sin-
gle restaurant in 1969 to 1,119 franchised units in 1978. 1978 Ann. Rep. of Wendy's Interna-
tional, Inc., 1. Moreover, the central city areas offer increasingly attractive opportunities for
expansion, as do the college campuses and the international markets. See Vaughn, supra
note 8, at 37-38; FRANCHISING-1979, supra note 21, at 5-7.
6, See OzANE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 76-77.
70 Id. Franchising is also different ftom other methods of doing business, in that it does
not require a nationwide dealer network or access to unique sources of supply or to
unique patent rights. Id.
Stephenson & House, supra note 8, at 36.
72 See, e.g., OZ'NNE & HuNT, supra note 28, at 32; C. ROSENFIELD, THE LAw OF FRANCHIS-
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pansion enables the franchisor to realize economies of scale earlier
in the franchise system's life cycle7" and allows the risks of opera-
tion to be shared among the franchisor and the franchisees.74
Despite these obvious advantages, even in the aggregate they
do not constitute franchising's chief benefit to the franchisor. Most
franchisors believe greater manager motivation to be the most im-
portant benefit of franchising.
2. Franchisee Motivation
The single most important benefit of franchising to the
franchisor, and the principal reason for franchising's success as a
way of doing business, is the participation of local, highly moti-
vated managers committed to their businesses because of their
ownership interest.
There is little doubt that franchisees are more highly moti-
vated than company employees. 5 While company employees may
have at stake their future advancement and perhaps their compen-
sation or even their present positions, franchisees put at risk their
ownership interest in the franchised outlet. In some cases, the su-
perior performance of highly motivated franchisees translates into
greater profitability for the franchisor than is obtained from com-
pany-owned units. 71
ING 8 (1970); Oxenfeldt & Thompson, supra note 54, at 9. At least one author rejects the
capital market explanation for franchising, arguing that if raising capital were the reason for
franchising, the franchisor would do better to create a portfolio of shares of all outlets and
sell shares to his managers. Rubin, supra note 14, at 225. But see Hunt-1973, supra note 49,
at 12. Rubin theorizes that franchising is an attempt to allocate property rights between
franchisor and franchisee in the areas that they can efficiently control. Rubin, supra note 14,
at 229.
73 Stephenson & House, supra note 8, at 36, col. 1.
71 Lillis, Narayana & Gilman, Competitive Advantage Variation over the Life Cycle of a
Franchise, J. MARKrING, Oct., 1976, at 77. In addition to shared risk, the authors list the
advantages of franchising as being rapid access to markets, reduced capital costs, highly
motivated franchisees, an ability to service marginal locations, growth in independent
businesses and reduced economic concentration. Id.
11 See Convenience Store Franchising, supra note 49, at 91, 94: "The franchisee is the
equivalent of a partner, and his motivation and drive to succeed are far greater than the
corporate store manager." Id. at 91. As stated by Norman D. Axelrad, McDonald's Vice
President for Public Affairs: "The reason McDonald's is committed to franchising is sim-
ple-the efforts of someone who both owns and manages his or her business provide the
McDonald's System with a skilled, involved, innovative management ability which we be-
lieve would not be otherwise obtainable." Mikva bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 175, 177.
11 In 1978, the average sales for company-owned establishments were $520,546; for fran-
chisee-owned establishments, sales averaged $662,621. FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at
69, 81. In 1971, it was reported that the average franchised convenience store produced sales
29% greater than company-owned units. Convenience Store Franchising, supra note 49, at
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C. The Benefits of Franchising to the Franchisee
Included among the frequently asserted benefits of franchising
to the franchisee are the profitability of franchised operations, 77
franchising's low entry barriers, the opportunity to become an inde-
pendent businessman, the advantages of the franchisor's trade-
mark, goodwill, marketing and operations plan, and initial and
continuing assistance, all of which enable the franchisee to com-
pete more effectively with outlets of large, vertically integrated
chains.
1. Franchising's Low Entry Barriers
The Commerce Department has published 1978 figures regard-
ing the initial cash required of a franchisee to begin operating
"non-traditional" types of franchises.71 Many types of franchises,
such as tax preparation, employment, retailing (non-food), and ed-
ucational products and services, can be started with as little as
$1,000 to $3,000 in cash.79 While the cash necessary to begin a fast
food franchise can run as high as $300,000, some can be started
with as little as $5,000.0 Of course, hotel and motel franchises re-
quire considerably more start-up cash.81
91. Franchisees are more likely to perform their own maintenance, thereby avoiding the costs
of using outside contracting, and adopt sales practices which produce a larger sales volume.
Id. at 91. See also Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 302 (statement of Philip F.
Zeidman); Burck, supra note 7, at 117, col. 1.
To be sure, new franchisees may be more highly motivated than more mature franchis-
ees, and thus greater efforts are required of the franchisor to motivate more established fran-
chisees. The key to franchisee motivation over the life of the franchise agreement is mainte-
nance of the franchisees' confidence in the franchise system through continuous
communication. See McGuire, supra note 7, at 55-56.
n The 1971 Ozanne-Hunt report indicated that in 1969, the median family income for
fast food franchisees was $16,000. OzANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 141-42. This was $6,000
per year higher before adjustments than the median income for these franchisees in the year
just prior to their purchases of their units, id. at 141, and $6,414 higher than the national
median for families in 1969. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 409 (1976).
78 FRANCHISINGo-1980 supra note 6, at 88.
9 Id. Obviously, start-up costs can be significantly higher. For example, the median
start-up costs for employment services and educational products and services were $20,000
and $15,000, respectively.
91 Id. The median start-up cost for a fast food establishment was $40,000 in 1978.
81 Id. Start-up costs for such businesses ranged from a low of $10,000 to a high of
$700,000, with a median figure of $100,000.
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2. The Franchisee as an Independent Businessman
A franchisee's degree of independence may be measured by the
extent to which the franchisee may operate the franchised business
according to his or her own desires. Franchisee independence has
been said to be limited by the extent of franchisor "operations
programming" agreed upon in the franchise contract and the success
of this programming in branding the products sold or services
rendered by the franchisees.12 Operations programming is the
franchisor's specification of and supervision over the marketing and
operations plan; the extent of operations programming is determined
by analyzing the franchisor's controls over the franchisee's
operation.8 3 Branding is the giving of a name or image to a product or
service; the extent of branding is measured by gauging the degree of
consumer awareness and preference for the franchise system's
products or services within the relevant market.8 4
12 Stephenson & House, supra note 8, at 37.
11 Id. With respect to operations programming, the 1971 Ozanne-Hunt study analyzed
the degree of fast food franchisees' independence by questioning franchisees regarding their
perceived degree of control over seven key operating variables: hours of operation, bookkeep-
ing, menu control, content and media of local advertising, retail prices, standards of cleanli-
ness and number of employees. OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 152-53. A majority of the
responding franchisees believed that they had almost complete control over hours of opera-
tion, bookkeeping, local advertising, pricing and number of employees. In the remaining ar-
eas, franchisees perceived themselves as having significant control. Only in determining the
menu did franchisees perceive their franchisors as having almost complete control. Id. The
percentages of the responding franchisees who stated that they had almost complete respon-
sibility for the listed areas, in the order listed, were 55.6, 70.4, 61.9, 54.5 and 91.7%, respec-
tively. Thirty-three and seven-tenths per cent of the responding franchisees believed that their
franchisors had almost complete control over adding or deleting items from the menu. A
majority of the responding franchisors, on the other hand, believed that they had major
responsibility for bookkeeping, menu, local advertising and cleanliness, and 47% believed they
had almost complete control over two other operating variables, hours of operation and pricing.
Id.
Ozanne and Hunt grouped responses into six categories: Categories 1-3 are considered to
include responses which perceive the franchisor as having control over an area; 3-6 are
franchisee control responses. The data referred to above reflect responses only in category
6-the strongest possible expression of perceived franchisee control. The data referred to with
respect to franchisor perceptions reflect an aggregation of responses falling in categories 1-3.
Looking only at franchisor responses falling within category 1, the converse of category 6, one
sees that in none of the listed areas did a majority of franchisors perceive themselves as having
almost complete responsibility. Only in determining the number of employees did franchisors
believe franchisees had almost complete control. Id. Fifty-five and two-tenths percent of the
responding franchisors believed that their franchisees had almost complete control over
determining the number of employees. A majority of the responding franchisors also believed
that their franchisees had the greater share of responsibility for determining hours of operation
and setting retail prices. Hunt summed up the study's findings by stating: "The present study
concluded that franchisees believg they are independent since they perceive themselves to
have primary responsibility for six out of seven key operating areas. Hunt, supra note
25, at 33.
11 Stephenson & House, supra note 8, at 37. Successful branding reinforces operations
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The notion that franchisees are totally independent business-
men has clearly been oversold. Indeed, no businessman is totally
independent and free of controls, since all businesses are subject to
controls imposed by the government, suppliers, creditors, and ac-
counting rules. The most significant controls are imposed by the
businessman's customers, who demand uniformly high quality in
the products sold and services rendered. In no other method of do-
ing business are controls more necessary than in franchising. Suc-
cessful franchising depends upon the development and main-
tenance of standardized, centralized controls over the fran-
chisee's business practices to ensure uniform quality throughout
the franchise system.5 As a consequence, to ensure the success of
programming by establishing clear customer expectations from which it difficult for the
franchisee to deviate. Thus, to the degree that branding is successful, the franchisor may
obtain greater control over the franchisee because of the franchised outlet's increased profit
potential, reduced risk and attractiveness as an investment opportunity. See id. at 37.
Consequently, to the extent that branding efforts are successful, the franchisee's independence
may be correspondingly decreased.
5 See Axelrad, supra note 11, at 697; Ray, supra note 16, at 238. One commentator has
stated this proposition as follows: "Franchisees must agree to restrictions, or else the bed-
rock of the concept-uniformity-is undermined." Washington: Are Controls in the Works?,
VOLUME FEEDING MANAGEMENT, Jan., 1970, at 34, 35. See 1 G. GuCKMAN, supra note 1, at §§
2-2.1 (quoting FTC memo to the Small Bus. Ass'n, March 10, 1966). Uniform quality is
especially important when products are sold or services rendered under the franchisor's
trademark, for, as discussed above, successful branding leads to clear customer expectations.
See Stephenson & House, supra note 8, at 37. Once customer expectations have been
established by successful branding, they can be preserved only through franchisor controls. Id.
Favorable perceptions fostered by successful branding would be lost if they were permitted to
be altered by condoning franchise mismanagement or allowing total independence of
operation. See also Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionability-Franchise Remedies for
Termination, 29 Bus. LAw. 227, 230 (1973). Thus, to the extent that uniform standards of
quality are undermined by a lack of franchisor controls or by a franchisee's disregard of the
franchisor's restrictions, both the franchisor and the other franchisees in the system inevitably
will suffer.
Moreover, there appears to be a trend in the law in the direcion of imposing greater
liability upon franchisors for the quality of their products and services and for policing their
trademarks. See Hewitt, supra, at 230-31; Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 590, 619
(statement of E. Bruce Butler); id. at 619 (statement of Rep. Krueger). See generally 1 G.
GLICKMAN, supra note 1 at §§ 4.03, 4.06. In recent years, franchisors increasingly have been
held liable for the torts and contracts of their franchisees. See, e.g., Wood v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 508 F.2d 167, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1975)(negligence); Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp., 21
Cal. App. 3d 541, 546-47, 98 Cal. Rptr. 588, 590-91 (1971) (breach of contract); Billops v.
Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978) (false imprisonment, intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, battery, assault); Singleton v. International Dairy
Queen, Inc., 332 A.2d 160, 161-62 (Super. Ct. Del. 1975) (personal injuries resulting from
negligent design of franchisee's establishment); Sapp v. City of Tallahassee, 348 So. 2d 363,
367 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977) (failure to provide adequate security); Buchanan v. Canada Dry
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the franchise system and of the individual franchisees, franchisors
are required to maintain sufficient controls over their franchisees to
ensure efficiency and quality throughout the system. 6 Franchisor
controls, however, tend to lessen the degree of independence of the
franchisee.
Nevertheless, despite necessary franchisor controls, the fran-
chisee still operates his or her own business, and ultimately deter-
mines its success or failure. Profits from franchising can be large,
and the growth of the franchisee's realizable equity in the business
substantial. In most cases, these would seem to be more significant
benefits to the franchisee than complete independence.
3. Franchisor Assistance to the Franchisee
While not without cost to the franchisee in the form of de-
creased independence, franchising enables the franchisee to com-
pete more effectively with outlets of large, vertically integrated
chain outlets. Through franchising, the franchisee obtains the ben-
efits of the franchisor's marketing and operations plan and assis-
tance in setting up and operating the franchise. 7 As discussed
above, franchising enables business risks to be spread among the
franchisor and the franchisees.
Upon joining an established franchise system, the new fran-
chisee begins its operation with a pre-sold trade name and proven
goodwill in addition to the marketing and operations plan.8 8 Most
Corp. 138 Ga. App. 588, 226 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (traffic accident). See generally
Note, Liability of a Franchisor for Acts of the Franchisee, 41 So. CAL. L. REv. 143 (1967);
Note, A Franchisor's Liability for the Torts of His Franchisee, 5 U.S.F.L. REv. 118 (1970).
The recent cases are collected in Pritikin & Wilcox, Franchisor's Vicarious Liability for Torts
of Franchisees, IFA CURRENT LEGAL DIGEST, Sept. 25, 1978, at 9-15; Annot., 81 A.L.R.3d 764
(1977).
81 Some prospective franchisees might as a matter of temperament be unwilling to ac-
cept necessary franchisor controls. Accordingly, instead of promoting franchising as affording
prospective franchisees with an opportunity to become totally independent businessmen,
franchisors should emphasize through initial disclosure and continuous communication the
critical importance of maintaining uniform quality throughout the franchise system and
franchisee conformity to franchisor restrictions necessary to achieve this end.
' See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 86; id. at 303 (statement of Philip F.
Zeidman).
" This fact stems from successful branding and operations programming designed to
maintain the integrity of the branded products. See Bernstein, supra note 53, at 26. Those
franchisees who enter franchise systems at earlier stages in their development and before
imitators are on the scene usualily invest less to join and achieve greater results than later
participants who may pay increased fees, face stiffer competition in the market and obtain less
choice sites. Id.
The pre-opening package varies among franchisors. The franchisor supplies the particular
franchise concept, including the trademark and the marketing and operations plan. Wattel,
Are Franchisors Realistic and Successful in Their Selection of Franchisees?, J. RETAILING 54, 65
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franchisors also provide guidance and direct assistance in such cap-
ital matters as site selection, design and engineering of the fran-
chisee's facility, choice of interior configuration, necessary operat-
ing equipment, furniture, and general contractor services. 9
Another form of franchisor aid frequently offered is direct loans
or assistance in arranging financing from other sources." Moreover,
some franchisors aid their franchisees by constructing the facilities
and then leasing them to the franchisee. Additionally, many
franchisors assist franchisees in securing the equipment necessary
to commence operations.9 2
Franchisor training programs enable many prospective fran-
chisees with little or no prior business experience to enter a field
that they would otherwise be unable to enter. 3 Most franchisors
provide franchisees with formal training programs and on-the-job
training. The 1971 Ozanne-Hunt study found that 78.2% of all re-
sponding fast food franchisors provided a formal training program
at a central location, with the median length of this training being
(Special Issue on Franchising 1974). See also Brown, Benefits of Franchising, N.Y.L.J., June 8,
1971, at 1, col. 1, quoted in Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 2, at 86-87.
11 See OZANNE & HuNT, supra note 28, at 125-32; Bernstein, supra note 54, at 28-30. Site
selection is critical in many types of franchised businesses, especially fast food restaurants.
As shown by the 1971 Ozanne-Hunt study, the majority of fast food franchisors pre-select
locations and offer them to franchisees, although many franchisees have significant input in
site selection. OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 126-28. The "normal procedure" of 54.1% of
the responding franchisors was to make this preselection and offer, according to the study.
Id. However, only 38% of the responding franchisees reported that their franchisors selected
their locations. "Well-operated [franchisors] will issue a franchise only for a location or area
where the franchisee has good prospects for success." Bernstein, supra note 53, at 30. Most
responding franchisees were generally statisfied with the quality of franchisor site selection,
and the better the franchisee rated the franchisor's site selection, the higher was the income
earned. OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 126-28.
'0 FRANCHISING-1978, supra note 9, at 10.
,1 OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 129-30; see Bernstein, supra note 53, at 29-30.
However, Ozanne and Hunt found that most franchisees owned or held the master lease on
the land (nearly 60%) and owned or held the master lease on the building (more than 60%).
OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28 at 129-30. Also, 96.7% of the responding franchisors retained
the right to approve the physical layout of the establishment, according to Ozanne and
Hunt. Id. at 130-31. Where a distinctive building or physical layout is part of a branding effort
the franchisor must ensure that all franchisees support that effort. Franchisor controls over the
physical layout aid the franchisee, as indicated by Ozanne and Hunt's finding that franchisees
in specially-designed buildings were more financially successful than others. Id. at 131. Despite
some franchisee's complaints that franchisors impose ruinously expensive layout changes,
layout changes such as in-store seating have been responsible for substantial volume increases.
See INsTrrurioNS/VOLUME FEEDING, Oct. 15, 1977, at 112.
32 OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 132. Only 23.3% of the fast food franchisors re-
sponding to the Ozanne and Hunt survey reported that they required franchisees to purchase
equipment from them. Nevertheless, 89.7% of the franchisees did purchase equipment from
the franchisor, and the majority of those who did rated it "above average" or "excellent."
Only 10.7% rated the equipment "below average" or "poor." Id.
93 See Wattel, supra note 88, at 65; Bernstein, supra note 53, at 30.
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two weeks." Participation in a quality training program increases
the franchisee's probability of success; those franchisees who had
attended had higher incomes than those who did not. Almost all
franchisors provide on-the-job training as well. The Ozanne-Hunt
study found that over ninety percent of the responding franchisors
provided on-the-job training; the median length was also two
weeks.95 Similar to those participating in the formal training pro-
grams, franchisees who attended on-the-job training had higher in-
comes than those who did not.9" In addition to pre-opening assis-
tance, 'almost all franchisors provide continuing assistance to their
franchisees.9" The Better Business Bureau has stated that the
franchisor's continuing assistance to the franchisees is "one of the
best justifications for the whole franchise system.""
" OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 134. A majority of the responding franchisees rated
the franchisor's formal training program "above average" or "excellent"; relatively few
found these programs to be below average. Id. at 135. See Bernstein, supra note!3, at 30-31.
" OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 135-37. On-the-job training was not rated by fran-
chisees as highly as formal training programs. Id. However, 38.7% of the responding fran-
chisees rated such training as "above average" or "excellent" and only 25.8% rated it "below
average" or of "poor quality."
96 Id.
97 Id. at 137, 155-59. See also Bernstein, supra note 53, at 31-33.
11 Bernstein, supra note 53, at 31. Continuing assistance may take the form of manuals
detailing the marketing and operations plan; bookkeeping and record keeping advice and
assistance; periodic inspections, assistance and advice from the franchisor's field supervisors;
franchisee employee training; the opportunity for centralized purchasing; pricing assistance;
and national and local advertising and promotional activities. Id. at 31-33. See also OZANNE &
HUNT, supra note 28, at 156.
The Ozanne-Hunt study found that the m'ajority of responding fast food franchisees
rated their franchisors' continuing assistance to be of average quality or better, id. at 156-59,
although franchisees expressed substantial discontent with bookkeeping, advertising, day-to-
day advice, field supervisors and pricing assistance. Frequently voiced complaints were that
franchisees did not know how the national advertising fund was being used and that local
advertising too often resulted in expensive promotions. Id.
Franchisee discontent with franchisor pricing assistance centered about the franchisor's
efforts to keep prices low. Id. at 158. Ozanne and Hunt commented that as long as franchisor
revenue from the franchise is based upon franchisee sales rather than upon franchisee profit,
a potential conflict of interest will exist between franchisors and franchisees. (Of course,
vertical integration would eliminate any such conflict of interest, but would also eliminate
the benefits of franchising). They believed, however, that to base franchisor revenue upon
franchisee profit would require much greater franchisor control over the franchisee's book-
keeping system. Id. at 159. For another statement of the Ozanne-Hunt conflict of interest
theory, see Brown, Franchise Equities, 63 MAss. L. REv. 109, 110 (1978).
Professor Rubin has criticized the Ozanne-Hunt conflict of interest theory, noting that
most franchisors retain adequate controls over franchisee bookkeeping to enable them to
base their revenues on franchisee profits. Rubin, supra note 14, at 229. Cf. Brown, supra note
48, at 665 ("And in almost all franchises, the franchisee is required to disclose his most . . .
confidential financial records to the franchisor."). Indeed, it has been reported that South-
land Corp. bases its 7-Eleven franchisees' payments on gross profits. Convenience Store
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4. Franchisee Satisfaction
Despite significant franchisor-franchisee differences of opinion
regarding various aspects of the franchise relationship, Ozanne and
Hunt found that over sixty-five percent of the responding franchis-
ees were sufficiently satisfied with their franchised businesses and
that "if they had it to do over again," they would still choose to be
franchisees with their present systems.9 Only 6.7% would prefer to
change systems, and 68.8% desired to renew their franchise agree-
ments upon expiration.' ° Recent Commerce Department data show
that in 1978, 15,373 franchise arrangements came up for renewal;
only 1,074, or 6.9% of the agreements up for renewal, were not re-
newed because the franchisee alone did not want to renew.'
D. Conclusions
The available evidence demonstrates that franchising signifi-
cantly benefits society, the franchisor, and the franchisee.
Franchising contributes to economic deconcentration by encourag-
ing the creation of relatively small, independently owned busi-
nesses. Although the available evidence is inconclusive, it would
appear that franchised businesses have a significantly greater
chance for success than other types of businesses. Franchising has
greatly benefited franchisors in that it requires low initial and ex-
pansion capital. But most important is franchising's unique provi-
sion of local, highly motivated owner-operators not otherwise
available.
Franchising, supra note 49, at 91. Professor Rubin argues that basing franchisor revenue on
sales instead of profits gives the franchisor the correct incentives to police franchisee per-
formance. Rubin, supra note 14, at 229. As discussed above, franchisor policing to ensure the
maintenance of uniform quality standards is essential to the success of a franchise system.
The quality of the franchisor's continuing assistance appears to be related to franchisee
success. Ozanne and Hunt found that as the perceived quality of franchisor assistance im-
proves, franchisee income rises. OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 159.
" OZANNE & HuNT, supra note 28, at 159, 171.
11 Id. A more recent study conducted in 1977 by the Continental Franchise Review indi-
cates that only 3.9% of the franchisees actually chose not to renew their franchise agree-
ments when they expired. Franchisor Trends, supra note 52, at 14. Statistics gathered by the
International Franchise Association indicate the annual rate of franchise nonrenewal to be
0.03%. Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 344 (statement of Philip F. Ziedman). This rate is
based on data furnished by the Michigan Securities Commission for 1974-1976. Information
for Wisconsin from the same period indicated a 0.00% annual rate of franchise nonrenewal.
"I' FRANCHISINo-1980, supra note 6, at 11.
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Finally, franchising's low entry barriers allow the franchisee to
own his or her own business with good chances for success.
Through franchising, the franchisee gains the important benefits of
the franchisor's trademark, goodwill, and assistance in setting up
and operating the franchise. Franchisees are not totally indepen-
dent businessmen, of course, nor can they be if successful franchis-
ing, which depends in large measure upon the maintenance of uni-
form quality throughout the system and therefore upon franchisor
controls, is to be preserved.
It may be seen, therefore, that franchising, while by no means
a sure road to success or a way of doing business without substan-
tial difficulties, significantly benefits society, the franchisor and the
franchisee. The foregoing analysis of these benefits has sought to
provide a realistic appraisal of franchising, without any of the over-
promotion once associated with franchising. Unfortunately, over-
promotion by some franchisors did exist, however, and it not un-
naturally engendered unrealistic franchisee expectations. When
these expectations went unfulfilled, some franchisees turned to the
legislatures and the courts for assistance, citing a number of
franchisor abuses allegedly existing in franchising and claiming
that these abuses stemmed from an imbalance of bargaining power
between franchisor and franchisee.
V. BARGAINING POWER IN FRANCHISING
The principle abuses associated with franchising are claimed
to be misrepresentation, nondisclosure and other forms of
franchisor overpromotion, unreasonable franchisor requirements,
and arbitrary and capricious termination by franchisors.12 Propo-
nents of legislation regulating the franchise relationship claim that
these abuses arise from a disparity of bargaining power between
franchisor and franchisee"'3 and assert that they are widespread
,2 See Kamenshine, Competition Versus Fairness in Franchising, 40 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 197, 199 (1971); Hunt & Nevin, supra note 11, at 54.
I" See Howard & Dickinson, Legal-Economic Aspects of Franchising, 13 J. SMAUL Bus.
MANAGEMENT 21, 21 (1975). Howard and Dickinson claim that disparity of bargaining power
is due to the relative sizes of the franchisor and the franchisee, control by the franchisor over
a branded product's supply source or license, franchisor power over agreement renewal or
termination and franchisor control over certain operating decisions. Id.
Former Representative Abner J. Mikva, until his recent appointment to the federal
bench the principal sponsor of federal legislation that would regulate the franchise relation-
ship, has remarked:
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throughout the franchising "industry.""'4 It is contended that ex-
isting legal remedies are inadequate to correct these abuses and
therefore that legislation regulating the franchise relationship is
needed.'05
With the exception of abuses associated with the overpromo-
tion of franchising, however, which may be cured by full and fair
disclosure by franchisors, proponents of legislation regulating the
franchise relationship have been unable to document any such
widespread abuses. Moreover, the isolated abuses other than those
associated with overpromotion that do occur are susceptible to cor-
rection through the enforcement of existing legal remedies. Accord-
ingly, the existing and proposed legislation regulating the franchise
relationship can only be seen as the product of an overreaction to
the overpromotion of franchising.
A. Bargaining Power Between Franchisor and Prospective
Franchisee
It must be kept in mind that while franchising is no doubt
attractive, participation in franchising is not a necessity for an as-
pirant businessman. To be sure, in some industries, such as auto-
mobile dealerships or gasoline service stations, a franchise is a
virtual prerequisite to entry into the marketplace.' In most
In most states, the franchise relationship continues to be governed by traditional
contract law even though it lacks the principle upon which contract law is based -
equal bargaining power between the contracting parties. The underlying notion of a
"buy-sell" contract is a willing buyer and a willing seller, each free to go elsewhere,
or not buy at all.
Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 35 (testimony of Rep. Mikva).
Similarly, the Ozanne-Hunt report lists the principal indicators of imbalance of bar-
gaining power as secrecy of the franchise agreement, economic and information inferiority of
the franchisees, and greater and more detailed obligations placed upon the franchisee by the
franchise agreement. OzANEn & HuNT, supra note 28, at 55, 56. Ozanne and Hunt reported
that while 57.7% of the responding franchisors and 76.3% of the responding franchisees be-
lieved that the franchise agreement favors the franchisor, nearly 25% of the responding fran-
chisees believed that the agreement favored themselves.
"I4 See, e.g., Hunt & Nevin, supra note 11, at 54; Regulation of Franchising, supra note
11, at 1027-28. See also Ozr'ia & HUNT, supra note 28, at 55, 72.
'1 See Kamenshine, supra note 102, at 197, 210-21; Mikva bill Hearings, supra note 5,
at 33-37 (testimony of Rep. Mikva). See also H.R. 2305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R.
9144, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5016, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8982, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1976); H.R. 8349, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
1' See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); FTC v.
Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 227 (1968); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 368
(1965); Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976)(preamble);
Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 417 (testimony of Century 21 Real Estate Corp. by
John Moravek, House Counsel).
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cases, though, there are alternatives to franchising, particularly in
industries where business format franchising has been most suc-
cessful. No one is forced to become a franchisee to enter the mar-
ketplace. 07 Moreover, within franchising there are a multitude of
businesses available from which prospective franchisees can choose.
Thus, before entering into a franchise relationship, most prospec-
tive franchisees are, in the words of former Congressman Abner J.
Mikva, "free to go elsewhere, or not buy at all."1 18
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that franchisor size and expe-
rience always results in disparity of bargaining power between
franchisor and prospective franchisee. Of the 1,394 franchisors
identified by the most recent Commerce Department survey, 243
companies accounted for approximately eighty-five percent of the
establishments and sales."0 9 The remaining 1,151 franchise com-
panies, the overwhelming majority of franchisors, would thus
appear to be relatively small business enterprises, without the sub-
stantially greater bargaining power over prospective franchisees
ascribed to franchisors generally by proponents of legislation regu-
lating the franchise relationship.110
Although the popular impression of prospective franchisees
may be that they are all individual businessmen, this is not always
the case. Many partnerships, limited partnerships, and investor
syndicates have become franchisees. Indeed, many large, multi-
million dollar corporations have entered franchising as franchis-
ees.'" Almost all franchisors permit multi-unit ownership by fran-
107 Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1223 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
823 (1976). Competition for high caliber franchisees is intense, for good franchisees are difficult
to find. See Bernstein, supra note 53, at 28; McGuire, supra note 7, at 55; Rubin, supra note 14,
at 232.
'' See note 103 supra.
rn FRANCHISING-1979, supra note 21, at 54. See also Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at
421, 423-24 (statement of John Hatch). Indeed, in infant industries it is not uncommon for a
franchisee to be in a much stronger bargaining position than the franchisor.
Ito See Gellhorn, supra note 24, at 472 n.23.
" For example, Collins Foods International is a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchisee,
operating 221 units. See 1978 Ann. Rep. of Collins Foods Int'l 10; Elliott, No Burned Fingers,
BARRON'S, Apr. 12, 1971, at 3. Other large Kentucky Fried .Chicken franchisees include Danner
Foods, Gino's and Kenflo Corp. J.C. Penney is Wendy's franchisee in Europe. Wall St. J., Feb.
21, 1979, at 23, col. 1. Marcus Corporation operates 33 Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets and 65
Big Boy franchises. 1978 Ann. Rep. of Marcus Corp. 4; Murray, supra note 24, at 47. Burger
King's largest franchisee, and perhaps its most successful franchisee, is Chart House Inc.,
which operates 278 outlets and sublicenses 54 others. 1978 Ann. Rep. of Chart House Inc. 1;
Fast-Food Franchisors Squeeze Out the Little Guy, Bus. WEEK, May 31, 1976, at 42, 46.
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chisees, '1 2 and the Commerce Department has reported a trend to-
ward multi-unit ownership by franchisees.' 3 Some franchisees are
publicly held and listed on the New York Stock Exchange." 4 In-
deed, some franchisees are larger than their franchisors.115
Obviously, large business enterprises are less susceptible to
franchisor pressure than individual businessmen and thus cannot
credibly claim a significant disparity of bargaining power with their
franchisors. In fact, legislation regulating the franchise relationship
might actually unbalance rather than balance the bargaining
power between these franchisees and their franchisors.15
Nor, as some would have it, are prospective franchisees mere
naifs, ripe for exploitation by experienced franchisors. The 1971
Ozanne-Hunt report is quite revealing about the prior experience of
fast food franchisees. Thirty-two percent of the responding fran-
chisees were self-employed before purchasing their franchises; some
had even owned franchises in other systems. Twenty-seven percent
of the franchisees previously were business managers or corporate
professionals, and seventeen and one-half percent were white-collar
workers or skilled blue-collar workers or foremen."1
7
It had been asserted that most prospective franchisees do not
consult lawyers before signing the franchise agreement."' The
1971 Ozanne-Hunt study showed, however, that over sixty percent of
the responding franchisees consulted lawyers before entering into the
franchise agreement. Of those franchisees who did not consult
lawyers, 35.9% consulted existing franchisees and 32.2% consulted
-, See Fast-Food Franchisors Squeeze Out the Little Guy, Bus. WEEK, May 31, 1976, at
46, 48; The Fast-Food Stars, Bus. WEEK July 11, 1977, at 56, 59. Ozanne and Hunt reported
that of the responding franchisees, 27.8% operated from 2 to 35 units. OzANNE & HUNT, supra
note 28, at 102-03.
, FRANCHISING-1979, supra note 21, at 4.
' See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 248 (testimony of Edward Kushell). Ex-
amples of publicly held corporations include Gino's Inc. and Collins Food Int'l.
",5 Id. See Kohn, The Importance of Franchise Class Actions, 47 ANrrRusT L.J. 915, 919
(1979). Large corporations which have operated franchised establishments as one small facet
of their business include Standard Oil of Ohio (Dutch Pantry), American Broadcasting Co.
(Holiday Inn), and Great Lakes Carbon Corp. (Holiday Inn). See Bernstein, supra note 53,
at 35.
"I See Axelrad, supra note 11, at 713 n.43; Mikva bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 48, 54
(testimony of then Deputy Assistant Attorney General Joe Sims).
M7 OzANNz & HuNT, supra note 28, at 110-12. See Regulation of Franchising, supra note
11, at 1028 n.7. It has been reported that Wendy's has concentrated on selling franchise
territories rather than single-unit franchises, and on selling primarily to experienced fast
food operators. Bus. WEEK, Sept. 20, 1976, at 101.
W H. BRoWN, FRANCHISING: REALrrIms AND RImEmzs 17 (2d ed. 1978).
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accountants."' Today, the percentage of prospective franchisees
who consult lawyers is undoubtedly greater.
The balance of bargaining power between franchisor and pro-
spective franchisee may be affected by the terms of the franchise
agreement. In many franchise systems, franchisees must invest
upwards of $500,000 for their franchises; it is quite unlikely that
such franchisees enter franchising with their eyes closed. It stands
to reason that the larger the required investment, the more likely it
is that the prospective franchisee will exercise due care when enter-
ing into the franchise agreement.'20
The duration of the franchise relationship may also affect the
balance of bargaining power between franchisor and prospective
franchisee. Recent data collected by the International Franchise
Association shows that approximately sixty-three percent of the
franchise agreements analyzed were for at least 10 years, and about
thirty-one percent were for at least 20 years.'2 Commerce Depart-
ment figures show that about seventy-eight percent of the agree-
ments issued in 1978 were for 10 years or more and that nearly half
were for 20 years or more.'2  Prospective franchisees would natu-
rally be more careful when signing agreements of long duration.
Thus, it would appear that the longer the duration of the agree-
ment, the more likely it is that the prospective franchisee has care-
fully evaluated the terms of the agreement and knowingly agreed to
the terms.'2
' OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 119-20.
' See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 162 (statement of Thomas W. Power);
FRANcHIsING-1980, supra note 6, at 88 (table showing total investment and start-up cash
required for franchised businesses).
2I See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 344-46 (testimony of Philip F. Zeidman).
The IFA examined statistics from three large industrial states, Michigan, Wisconsin and
Illinois, as gleaned from franchisors' 1977 Uniform Franchise Offering Circular filings. Pre-
sumably, these filings included those of "traditional" franchisors, and thus the figures may
not be strictly comparable to the Commerce Department's figures discussed in the text ac-
companying note 120 infra.
'22 FRANCHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 11.
'1 Decision Criteria, supra note 53, at 88; see ABA FORUM COMM. ON FRANCHISING, FIRST
ANN. FORUM, Outline of Jules L. Garel 1 (1978). Mr. Garel notes:
The modem franchisee is no longer a no-experience novice. The typical new
franchisee, in many industries, is a professional franchisee-compared with the
C2amateur franchisee of the late 1950's, and the 1960's.
Franchisors now seek out and contract with well financed, well organized per-
sons and companies with experience in the business of the franchise. Franchisees
are often well represented by highly-qualified counselors-lawyers, CPA's and bus-
iness consultants.
The time of total futility in negotiating from the franchisee's side of the table
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B. Full Disclosure: The Effective Equalizer of Bargaining Power
While in many cases the bargaining power of the franchisor
and the prospective franchisee may be substantially equal, in
others it may not because of the particular prospective franchisee's
inexperience and lack of information. 124 Any such disparity of bar-
gaining power can effectively be equalized by full disclosure by the
franchisor. While not without costs, including the tendency of dis-
closure systems to become regulatory systems through internal
pressure, full disclosure enables prospective franchisees to make a
reasoned evaluation of the potential risks and benefits of
franchising.
To date, fourteen states have enacted legislation of the full dis-
closure variety,l2 and bills which would require full disclosure have
been proposed in a number of other states.12 Designed to protect
prospective franchisees from misrepresentation and nondisclosure
by franchisors, full disclosure laws require franchisors to provide
prospective franchisees with objective information sufficient to en-
able them to make a considered and informed decision.
Many of the disclosure provisions of proposed and enacted
state legislation are patterned on the California Franchise Invest-
ment Law.'2 The Franchise Investment Law requires a new
franchisor to register the offer of a franchise with the office of secur-
ities. The Commissioner of Securities has the authority to stop the
is over. Franchisors, particularly in sophisticated industries, expect and suggest
negotiations between the parties. Franchisors do not want franchisees to avail
themselves of the defense of unconscionability by franchisors saying "this is the
agreement, take it or leave it."
2 See generally Hunt, supra note 25, at 37.
12 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (Deering 1979); HAwAu REv. STAT. §§ 482E-1 to
482E-12 (1976 & Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§ 701-740 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.5-1 to .5-50 & § 23-2-2.7 to .7-7 (Bums Supp. 1979); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 56, §§ 345-365 (1979); MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 445.1501 to .1545 (Supp. 1979);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.01-.22 (West Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-19-01 to 51-19-17
(Supp. 1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 650.005-.085 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-28-1 to 19-28-15
(Supp. 1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 37-5A-1 to 37-5A-85 (1977 & Supp. 1979); VA.
CODE § 13.1-557 to .1-574 (1978 & Supp. 1979); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.100.010-.100.940
(1978); WXis. STAT. ANN. § 553.01-.78 (West 1979). See also FLA. STAT. § 817.416 (1975); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 75-24-55 (Supp. 1979).
I2 See, e.g., Tax. H.B. 332 (withdrawn by sponsor); The International Franchise Associ-
ation's Current Legal Digest regularly contains a Legislative Status Report which includes
state law developments. See, e.g., IFA CURRENT LEGAL DIGEST, No. 1979-9, Oct. 24, 1979, at
27-31.
12 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (Deering 1979) (effective January 1, 1971). The Cali-
fornia Franchise Investment Law is administered by the State Commissioner of Securities.
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sale of a franchise if the franchisor has failed to comply with the
requirements of the disclosure law if the sale would operate as a
fraud on prospective franchisees. Large franchisors, generally those
with a consolidated net worth of at least $5 million and with at
least twenty-five franchisees conducting business at all times dur-
ing the 5-year period immediately preceding the offer, are exempt
from the registration requirement but must nonetheless provide
comparable information to prospective franchisees. 2 1
The statute mandates disclosure in the registration application
of such information as the identity and background of the
franchisor and its principals; a recent financial statement; a sam-
ple franchise contract; the franchisor's policies with respect to
franchise fees, royalties, supplies, and franchise termination, re-
newal and repurchase provisions; available financing arrange-
ments; substantiation of profit projections; details of any celebrity
participation; and territorial protection given to the franchisee.
The registration application must be accompanied by a proposed
offering prospectus.1'
Franchisors subject to the registration requirement must pro-
vide the prospectus to all potential franchisees before the
franchisor receives any consideration or 48 hours before the execu-
tion of a franchise agreement. Moreover, all advertisements solicit-
ing prospective franchisees must be filed with the Commissioner at
least 3 business days before publication. As with the registration
requirement, large franchisors are exempt from filing their
advertisements. 3 0
The statute gives the franchisee a private right of action
against the franchisor for damages caused by the franchisor's viola-
tion of the disclosure provisions and, if the violation is willful, the
franchisee may seek rescission of the franchise agreement. 131
"2 Id. § 31101. Even for exempt franchisors, the California statute requires them to pro-
vide a history of the franchisor, a copy of a typical franchise agreement, the amount of the
franchise fee normally charged and a list of other fees, if any, a listing of conditions under
which the agreement may be terminated or not renewed, a description of operating restraints
on the franchisee, a description of any financing arrangements, the basis for any profit pro-
jections, and similar information. Id.
Id. §8 31111-31114. The requirements and format of the California law are similar to
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
'0 CAL. CORP. CODE § 31156 (Deering 1979).
"I Id.. § 31300. Again paralleling the federal securities laws, the California statute im-
poses liability upon the franchisor for failing to comply with the registration requirements
and for making material misstatements or omissions in its communications or in its filing
with the state.
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Over the past few years, bills have been introduced in Con-
gress that would require full disclosure,'32 but to date no such legis-
lation has passed. In December 1978, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion promulgated a Trade Regulation Rule, "Disclosure Re-
quirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Busi-
ness Opportunity Ventures" (FTC Rule), requiring full disclosure,
which took effect on October 21, 1979.' 83
The FTC Rule provides that it is an unfair or deceptive act or
practice within the meaning of section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act for a franchisor to fail to provide, within at least 10
days prior to the execution of a franchise agreement, a prospective
franchisee with a prospectus containing information similar to that
required by the California statute.' 34 In addition, a franchisor must
132 E.g., H.R. 8982, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 3844, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
"3 FTC Rule, supra note 11. The Rule was originally scheduled to take effect on July 21,
1979, but the effective date was extended to allow the FTC more time to consider the numer-
ous public comments received. According to the FTC, the Rule was "promulgated in re-
sponse to widespread evidence of deceptive and unfair practices in connection with the sale
of franchises and business opportunity ventures." 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,614 (1978). By
requiring full disclosure, the FTC is attempting to redress what it believes is a serious
"informational imbalance" existing between prospective franchisees and their franchisors. Id.
The FTC Rule defines the term "franchise" quite broadly, based on the FTC's finding
that the franchise relationship has three distinct conceptual characteristics distinguishing it
from conventional commercial relationships: "increased potential for success, loss of [fran-
chisee] independence, and a payment of capital to the franchisor by the franchisee." Id. at
59,699. Two types of commercial relationships are defined as "franchises": i) an arrange-
ment where the franchisee sells goods or services meeting the franchisor's quality standards,
the franchisor exercises significant control or gives significant assistance to the franchisee,
and the franchisee, pays more than $500 to the franchisor within 6 months after the
franchised business begins operation; and (ii) an arrangement where the franchisee sells
goods or services supplied by the franchisor, the franchisor secures accounts for the fran-
chisee or provides a location for the franchised business, and the franchisee pays $500 to the
franchisor within 6 months after the franchised business begins operations. Id. at 59,619-
59,620 (16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a) (1980)). The FTC's Statement of Basis and Purpose specifies that
an arrangement which is initially represented as a franchise (as the term is defined) is sub-
ject to the rule even if subsequent events result in its failure to qualify as a franchise, e.g.,
where the franchisor originally promised assistance but subsequently failed to provide it. Id.
at 59,699-59,700. The Rule applies to product and trade name franchising, called "product"
franchising, to business format or enterprise franchising, called "package" franchising, and
to such non-franchising commercial arrangements as rack jobbing and vending machine dis-
tributorships, called "business opportunity ventures." Id. at 59,697-59,698. The inclusion of
"business opportunity ventures" in rules dealing with franchising is unusual and confusing.
The Commerce Department in its analysis of franchising has never taken such an expansive
view of franchising, nor have most commentators on franchising. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note
25, at 34.
"3 FTC Rule, supra note 11, at 59,614 (16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a) (1980)). The required
statement may be provided to the franchisee in either a document prepared according to
interpretive guides issued by the franchise staff of the FTC, see 44 Fed. Reg. 49,966, Aug. 24,
1979, or in conformity with the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) Guidelines,
which a number of states have adopted for registration and disclosure of franchise offerings.
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disclose detailed information about franchise terminations,
nonrenewals and repurchases, and franchisee training.'35 The Rule
permits franchisors to include statements of projected or forecasted
earnings, income, or sales for a prospective franchisee, provided
they are supported by a reasonable basis and presented in a format
disclosing their underlying material assumptions. 6
The Rule does not preempt state law giving equal or greater
protection to prospective franchisees.'37 The FTC may seek civil
penalties of up to $10,000 per day for violations of the Rule and
may also seek to enjoin continued violations. 3 In the "Statement
of Basis and Purpose" accompanying the Rule, the FTC declared
its belief that "the courts should and would hold that any person
injured by a violation of this rule has a private right of action
against the violator.' ' 3 It is quite doubtful, however, that the
"I FTC Rule, supra note 11, at 59,616 (16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a)(15)(1980)). The FTC concedes
that franchisors do not omit from the franchise agreement provisions dealing with renewals,
terminations, and repurchases. The FTC's concern seems to be that these provisions may be
buried in the agreements. Id. at 59,664. Given the amount of information required in the
FTC's prospectus, the FTC's concern may well go unsatisfied.
"I Id. at 59,617 (C.F.R. § 436.1(24)(b)(1980)). The FTC Rule prohibits inclusion of these
projections in the prospectus itself. The franchisor, however, may provide a prospective
franchisee with a separate written statement containing projections and the required
supporting information. Id.
1' Id. at 59,719-59,723. But see FANCHISING-1979, supra note 21, at 26-27. By not
preempting state law, the FTC rejected the requests of those who sought some semblance of
uniformity as a meritorious consequence of federal regulation in this area. The FTC justifies
its action by suggesting that the end result will be one standard, which will be an amalgam
of federal, state, and local laws. The problem with this argument is that it holds true only if
franchisors are willing to apply the most stringent "amalgam" in all locales. Even then, the
need to make state filings and comply with required state formatting rules creates the poten-
tial for an almost nightmarish situation. For example, by regulations effective January 1,
1980, California permits only the UFOC format with modification as provided in the regula-
tion; the FTC format will not satisfy the Commissioner of Corporations, who administers the
California Franchise Investment Law. The FTC also argues that in most situations, all state
and local laws and, "in large part," the FTC Rule can be complied with by using the Uni-
form Franchise Offering Circular. Certain provisions of the Rule will still control, however,
even if the UFOC format is used in lieu of the Rule's disclosure document. Such provisions
include (1) the persons required to make disclosure, (2) the transactions requiring disclosure,
(3) the timing of the disclosure, and (4) the types of documents to be given to prospective
franchisees.
"3 The FTC Rule purports to impose these penalties by labelling a violation of the
Rules as an "unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of section 5 of [the
Federal Trade Commission Act]." Id. at 59,614 (16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (1980)). Assuming arguendo
that the FTC by mere assertion can make a violation of the Rule illegal under the FTC Act, the
penalties are provided by statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 54 (1976). Following promulgation of the
FTC Rule, many franchisors filed petitions for judicial review. Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), March
12, 1979, at 9. These proceedings have been consolidated in the Ninth Circuit. In re FTC
Franchise Rule Review, No. 78-3680 (9th Cir. 1979).
"I FTC Rule, supra note 11, at 59,723.
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courts will agree with the FTC's position on the existence of a private
right of action under the Rule.4 '
The International Franchise Association (IFA) has gone on re-
cord in support of uniform national legislation or regulation which
would require full disclosure of all information material to the
purchase and continuing operation of the franchise,"' although a
representative of the IFA has criticized the FTC Rule for not pre-
empting state laws.4 2 To simplify the task of conforming with the
requirements of the various state disclosure laws, the IFA and the
Uniform Franchise Regulation Committee of the Midwest Securi-
ties Commissioners Association have produced the Uniform
Franchise Offering Circular and Registration Application (UFOC)."I
The "Statement of Basis and Purpose" accompanying the FTC Rule
provides that the FTC "will accept compliance with the UFOC as
compliance in large part with [the FTC] Rule."''
Full disclosure as mandated by the FTC Rule and state
legislation should prove sufficient to correct any informational
imbalance between franchisor and prospective franchisee. Indeed,
according to a 1976 study by Hunt,' state full disclosure laws have
greatly reduced the incidence of franchisor misrepresentation to
prospective franchisees regarding the potential profitability of their
franchises. 4 '
Other principal abuses associated with the overpromotion of
franchising seem to have been largely corrected as well. Headline
stories reporting on franchisees achieving "instant success" have
been replaced by sober analyses of franchising.4 ' More conservative
accounting standards have largely eliminated the reporting of
"I The courts have consistently held that there is no private right of action under sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See,. e.g., Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1248
n.2 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279
(9th Cir. 1973). But see Guernsey v. Rich Plain of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 589 (N.D.
Ind. 1976). For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Holloway v. Bristol-Myers
Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
l Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 310-12 (testimony of Philip F. Zeidman). The
International Franchise Association argues that disclosure laws are clearly preferable to stat-
utes that attempt to regulate the franchise relationship. Id.
W4 all St. J., Dec. 21, 1978, at 2, col. 4.
SFRANCHISING-1979, supra note 21, at 21; Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 353-56.
" FTC Rule, supra note 11, at 59,721. See note 133 supra.
"' Hunt & Nevin, supra note 11.
u4 Id. at 61. The study was limited to a survey of franchisors and franchisees in Wiscon-
sin. Id. The study found that only 15% of the responding franchisees claimed that their
franchisors had overestimated profitability during negotiations. A pre-disclosure law study
had put the same percentage at 37%. Id. at 56. Hunt and Nevin assumed that the disclosure
law was the cause of this drop. While acknowledging that the costs of complying with full
disclosure laws may tend to cause small franchisors to abandon franchising, Hunt and Nevin
concluded that overall benefits of these laws outweighed their costs. Id.
I See generally Coyle, supra note 42; Burck, supra note 7; Murray, supra note 24.
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franchising fees as current income,"' and as a result, the pressure
on franchisors to increase their sales of franchises in order to report
earnings growth has been reduced.' Many franchisors who relied
upon celebrity allure alone failed to weather the economic down-
turn of the 1970's and its attendant effects on franchising. Conse-
quently, the belief that a celebrity name automatically attracts
customers seems largely to have disappeared.'50
C. Bargaining Power During the Course of the Franchise
Relationship
While acknowledging that, with full disclosure, franchisors and
prospective franchisees possess equal bargaining power, former
Congressman Mikva has argued that as the relationship matures,
the balance of bargaining power becomes substantially unequal,
principally due to the franchisor's controls over the franchisee's
sources of operating supplies and the franchisor's power over termi-
nation and renewal. 5' While it may be true that some franchisors
have greater bargaining power than their franchisees, there is no
evidence that franchisor abuses of their bargaining power are wide-
spread throughout franchising. As discussed above, upon entering
franchising, the franchisee forgoes certain elements of indepen-
dence in operating the franchised business in return for the right to
operate under the franchisor's trademark and its marketing and
operations plan. Most franchisors also agree to provide their
franchisees with continuing assistance. Of course, depending upon
the franchisee's satisfaction with the franchise relationship, the
benefits of a strong trademark resulting from successful branding,
an effective marketing and operations plan, and desirable
franchisor assistance can also be viewed as contributing to "unde-
sirable" franchisor controls. This difference in franchisee percep-
tion, and not franchisor abuses of their bargaining power, would
appear to account for most of the conflicts between franchisor and
franchisee.
" See M. POLOWAY & D. CHARLES, ACCOUNTANTS SEC PRACTICE MANUAL 4436 (CCH
1971); Fritzmeyer & McKay, Accounting For Initial Franchise Fee Revenue, 129 J. AccouNT-
ANCY 66 (1970); Ray, supra note 16, at 235.
"I See Franchisors: Out of the Frying Pan?, FINANCIAL WORLD, Nov. 10, 1971, at 10;
Ray, supra note 16, at 235. The FTC Rule requires franchisors to provide audited financials
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards. FTC Rule, supra note
11, at 59,616-59,617 (16 C.F.R. § 436.1(a)(20) (1980)).
,m See Axelrad, supra note 11, at 705-06.
M See, e.g., Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 34-35, 41, 44 (testimony of Rep.
Mikva).
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1. Franchisor Controls Over Franchisee Sources of Operating
Supplies
The principal justification for franchisor controls over fran-
chisee sources of operating supplies is the need to maintain uni-
form standards of quality in the products sold and services ren-
dered throughout the franchise system. '52 Moreover, franchisors are
obligated by federal trademark law to ensure that the products or
services identified by the mark meet all owner quality standards at
the risk of loss of their trademark rights.'53
Except for isolated instances not shown to be widespread,'54
there is no evidence that as a matter of general practice, franchisors
abuse their controls over franchisee sources of operating supplies
to increase revenue or obtain kickbacks from approved suppliers.'55
Abuses of that nature, when they do occur, usually involve tying
arrangements, which raise questions under the antitrust laws.' 5
A tying arrangement is the conditioning of the sale of a desired
product (the tying product) upon the purchase of another less de-
sired product (the tied product). The principal anticompetitive ef-
fects of tying arrangements are said to be that the purchaser of the
tied product is forced to forego his or her free choice between com-
peting sellers of the tied product and that others who sell the tied
product are foreclosed from selling to purchasers of the tied
product.157
A tying arrangement is illegal per se under section 1 of the
Sherman Act whenever the seller has sufficient power over the ty-
5I See, e.g., Axelrad, supra note 11, at 697; Ray, supra note 16, at 238. Most franchisors
believe that controls over franchisees' sources of operating supplies are the only effective
means of insuring uniform quality. Id.
" See Axelrad, supra note 11 at 697-700; Hunt & Nevin, Tying Agreements in
Franchising, 39 J. MARKEGrNG 20, 23 (July 1975). The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055,
1064(e)(1), 1115(b)(7), 1127 (1976), requires the franchisor to exercise quality control. Failure
to exercise quality control could result in the trademark being deemed abandoned. See Hay-
maker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 261 (C.C.P.A. 1978); E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Celanese Corp., 167 F.2d 484, 489 (C.C.P.A. 1948); Morse-Starrett Products Co. v.
Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796, 805 (N.D. Cal 1949).
i See Hunt &Nevin, supra note 153, at 22.
255 Ozanne and Hunt reported that 41% of the responding franchisees believed that
franchisors receive commissions from franchisor-approved suppliers. OZANNE & HuNT supra
note 28, at 48. They provided no data, however, that would support such a belief.
"' See Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1974). In
the case of franchising, it is usually claimed that the tying product is the trademark or other
aspects of the relationship and the tied products are the operating supplies. See Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 46-47 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972);
Hunt & Nevin, supra note 153, at 21.
I" Hunt & Nevin, supra note 153, at 23.
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ing product to restrain free competition in the tied product and a
significant amount of interstate commerce is affected.' Many
states have "little Sherman Acts" also making tying arrangements
illegal,'59 and tie-ins by franchisors may run afoul of section 3 of the
Clayton Act 6' and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 61'
It has been asserted without convincing supporting data that
tie-ins are widespread in franchising. 2 Some franchisors are said to
tie the franchisee's initial equipment of operating supplies to the
franchisor's trademark or other aspects of the relationship. 3 The
controversy continues whether the franchise itself, the licensed
trademark or other aspects of the franchise relationship are suffi-
ciently separate and distinct "lroducts" to form the basis of a ty-
ing arrangement.'64 Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.,'65 it
is doubtful whether sufficient economic power can be presumed
solely from the fact that the alleged tying product is a trademark.'
'" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958).
"' See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.01-.12 (West 1972 & Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 60-3(4) (Smith-Hurd 1977); VA. CODE §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Supp. 1979).
"1 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). Section 3 of the Clayton Act was enacted to circumvent the
rule of reason limitations on reaching violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 297-300 (1949).
" ' 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic
Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
182 See Hunt & Nevin, supra note 153, at 24, 26. Hunt and Nevin based their conclusion
upon the Ozanne & Hunt study's findings that 70% of the responding franchisees were re-
quired to purchase at least some of their operating supplies from their franchisors and that
the median percentage of total operating supplies purchased was 50%. OZANNE & HUrr,
supra note 28, at 160. See also Cramping the Business Style of Franchisors, Bus. WEEK, June
16, 1975, at 82. Recently, the FTC conducted an investigation into tying arrangements in
franchising and concluded that no further "industrywide" action was warranted. TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 8 (Aug. 29, 1978).
' See Hunt & Nevin, supra note 153, at 21.
,84 Compare, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) and
Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972) and Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971)
(separate products) with Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 912 (1975) and Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1979)
and Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., [1979]12 TRADE CASES (CCH) 62,827 (D. Fla. 1979) and
Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., [1979] 1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 62,668
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (products not separate).
429 U.S. 610 (1977)(Fortner II).
18 In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
955 (1972), the court held that a trademark was "unique," thus giving rise to the presump-
tion of sufficient economic power. Id. at 49. This decision was based on rather ambiguous
language in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-05
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Finally, the per se tying rule does not apply if the fr'anchisor does
not sell, or have an equivalent economic interest in, both the tying
and the tied product. '
In any event, a voluntary purchase of two products is not a tie-
in; without franchisor coercion to purchase the tied product and
unless the tied product from the franchisor is unwanted, there is no
illegal tying arrangement.'68 Hence, the mere fact that franchise
(1969) (Fortner 1). The Chicken Delight case was followed by the fifth circuit, Warriner
Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1014-15 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); the eighth circuit, Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d
1336 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1976), and the FTC, Chock Full 0' Nuts, [1975]
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,441, but was rejected or at least questioned by the second
circuit, Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir. 1974), the third
circuit, Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1218 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
823 (1976), and the tenth circuit, Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
In Fortner II, the Supreme Court clarifiied and in several respects modified the reason-
ing of Fortner L United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977)
(Fortner II). Perhaps most significant, the Court, while reiterating the concept of unique-
ness, stated the controlling test in terms of "power . . . within the market for the tying
product" and "whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his competitors in the
market for the tying product." Id. at 620.
One difficulty in applying the Fortner II standards to franchising is defining the "mar-
ket for the tying product." It cannot be the market for the franchisor's trademark or license,
for the franchisor has no competitor in the market for its own trademark, and only licensees
of the franchisor can use its trademark legally. On the other hand, if the "market for the
tying product" is the market for the product sold by the franchisees, it is difficult to identify
any significant "advantage not shared by [the franchisor's] competitors" in that market. As
noted by the second circuit in the Capital Temporaries case, a trademark, unlike a patent,
does not prevent a competitor from copying the products sold by the franchisees. 506 F.2d at
663. And while in some industries the trademark may be a prerequisite to market entry, cf.
text accompanying note 106 supra (automobile dealerships and gasoline stations), in many
others it is not. In those cases in which it is not, the franchisor's competitors are free to
develop their own distinctive trademarks. Following Fortner II and noting the harsh criti-
cism which has been leveled against Chicken Delight, the court in Cash v. Arctic Circle,
Inc., [1979f 1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 63,095 (E.D. Wash. 1980), declined to recognize a pre-
sumption of economic power inherent in a trademark. But cf. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat
Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 725 (7th Cir. 1979) (sole national franchisor of drive-through photo
processing possessed sufficient power with regard to" the tying product, the trademark/
franchise).
117 See Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th
Cir. 1977); Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir. 1975).
I" See, e.g., Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953);
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 723 (7th Cir. 1979); Sargent-Welch Scien-
tific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 708 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822
(1978); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 377 (5th
Cir. 1977); Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1327 (5th Cir.
1976); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1224-25 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 823 (1976); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 665-66 (2d Cir.
1974); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Coleman Oil Co., 470 F.2d 925, 930 n.5 (1st Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 183 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Para-
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agreements may provide that franchisees must purchase initial
equipment or operating supplies from their franchisors or from
franchisor-approved sources does not mean franchisees are coerced
by their franchisors into making such purchases. To be sure, most
franchisees who understand the critical importance .of maintaining
uniform standards of quality throughout the franchise system will-
ingly-indeed, enthusiastically-accept franchisor purchase restric-
tions.
Some critics claim that the antitrust laws are inadequate to
deter illegal tying arrangements and other anticompetitive prac-
tices by franchisors.65 It is said that antitrust litigation is not pur-
sued by wronged franchisees because of the high costs in time and
money and the complexity of the antitrust laws."" The laws them-
selves, however, provide strong incentives for litigation: recovery of
attorneys' fees and treble damages.'7' Moreover, in appropriate
cases, injunctive relief may be obtained and illegal clauses stricken
from the franchise agreement, 72 and costs of maintaining antitrust
litigation may be spread through use of the class action device. 73
In order to obviate possible antitrust claims, prudent
franchisors should require their franchisees to purchase operating
supplies from them only when these supplies are not duplicable by
competing manufacturers. Franchisors who derive a significant
amount of revenue from sales of operating supplies would be well
advised to consider royalties as an alternative method of obtaining
mount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131, 1137 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972);
Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Corp., 350 F.2d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 1965). But see Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Co., 561 F.2d 434, 452 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Hill v. A-
T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1355 (2d Cir. 1976); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43
(9th Cir, 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
"I See Regulation of Franchising, supra note 11, at 1033-34. It is claimed that antitrust
suits are prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. Furthermore, they are said to be inef-
fective by always being after-the-fact. It is claimed that the franchisor may itself be insol-
vent by the time of the lawsuit and that the franchisee may, as a result of the antitrust law
violation, be unable to bear the cost of litigation. See also Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note
5, at 35 (testimony of Rep. Mikva).
'7o See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 511 (testimony of Samuel Bernstein).
" Id. at 267 (statement of Philip F. Zeidman).
2 Id. at 298.
173 See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972). Most of the franchisor tying arrangements cited by proponents of legislation
regulating franchising have come to light as a result of franchisee-prosecuted litigation or
complaints to the FTC. See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 587 (statement of Bruce
Butler). Franchisor controls over franchisee sources of operating supplies not reached by the
antitrust laws are those that are not illegal because of quality control considerations or lack
of franchisor coercion.
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revenue. Moreover, franchisors should set reasonable standards for
attaining approved supplier status and must not accept kickbacks
or rebates from approved suppliers.
2. Franchisor Control Over Termination and Nonrenewal of the
Franchise Agreement
According to proponents of legislation regulating the franchise
relationship, the root cause of the alleged bargaining power dis-
parity between franchisor and franchisee during the course of the
franchise relationship is franchisor control over termination and
nonrenewal of the franchise agreement. 14 The proponents have
contended that franchises have been terminated on arbitrary
grounds and that franchisors use the threat of termination or
nonrenewal to force franchisees to accept onerous and often
illegal requirements.1 15 These abuses are asserted to be wide-
spread throghout franchising and not susceptible of correction
by existing legal remedies. 171
Although termination and nonrenewal problems have been
identified in some industries, such as beer distributing, petroleum
marketing and automobile retailing, 177 the available evidence sim-
ply does not support claims that franchisor abuses regarding termi-
nation and nonrenewal are widespread in all industries.
The Ozanne-Hunt study did not collect data regarding termi-
nation and nonrenewal rates. Instead, Ozanne and Hunt analyzed
the provisions of fast food franchise agreements, regarding renewal,
the right to sell, inheritance, and termination.' 78 Eighty-two and
one-half percent of the franchisors responding to the survey indi-
cated that their franchise agreements were renewable at the fran-
chisee's option; the median length of the renewal term was 5
"I Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 33-34 (testimony of Rep. Mikva); id. at 440
(statement of Jerome R. Waldie); Brown, The Mikva bill, N.Y.L.J., April 13, 1976, at 1, col.
1, quoted in Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 80-82; Brown, supra note 48, at 662-63.
See also Hunt, supra note 45, at ,76-77.
" See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 138-40 (statement of Cathleen H. Douglas);
Brown, supra note 100, at 110; Burck, supra note 7, at 148.
-7 See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 33-35 (testimony of Rep. Mikva). In 1971,
Ozanne and Hunt found that almost 77% of the fast food franchisees surveyed believed that
federal legislation restricting the franchisor's right to terminate the franchise agreement was
necessary. OZANE & HurNT, supra note 28, at 276-77.
'" See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 291-92 (statement of Philip F. Zeidman);
FRANCHISING-1978, supra note 9, at 24; FRANCHISING-1977, supra note 65, at 2; Bennison,
supra note 8, at 157.
"' OZANNE & HUNT, supra note 28, at 269-83.
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years.'79 Most of the fast food franchise agreements provided that
the franchisee could sell the franchise to third parties, subject to
franchisor approval.'18 Sixty-four percent of the franchise agree-
ments studied contained a right of inheritance clause assuring the
passage of the franchisee's franchise rights to his or her heirs, pro-
vided their successors agreed to assume the deceased's
obligations.'"'
Discussing termination and nonrenewal, Ozanne and Hunt
listed three general causes of termination: franchisee bankruptcy,
expiration of the agreement, and default in the franchisee's per-
formance.' 82 Default was regarded as "sensitive" because of the
wide range of grounds for termination and the possibility of une-
qual enforcement of default clauses. Franchisors indicated that
they gave franchisees a median of 30 days to correct violations of
default provisions.' 3
The report noted that many critics of franchising implied that
franchisors held "the threat of termination over the heads of fran-
chisees."'" 4 Ozanne and Hunt reported no statistics regarding the
actual termination rate of franchisees, but the data they did de-
velop indicated that the critics incorrectly perceived franchisor
threats of termination. Although Ozanne and Hunt speculated that
nly 13.6% of the franchisors reported that they charged a renewal fee. Nearly 69%
of the franchisees indicated that they planned to renew their agreements, although some
expressed serious concern about renewal negotiations. Significantly, their strongest concern
centered about their franchisors' institution of a royalty fee for the first time in the new
franchise agreement. Id. at 270-71.
" Id. at 271-73. Approximately 48% of the agreements gave the franchisor the right of
first refusal. An identical percentage of the responding franchisees were allowed to sell to
any franchisor-approved third-party. The first-refusal arrangement may be more beneficial
to the franchisee in that it places the burden on the franchisor either to buy or agree. Several
franchisees reported that their franchisors had used their right of approval to introduce a
new, more stringent contract. Id. at 272. Ozanne and Hunt presented no evidence on how
prevalent this alleged practice was. While the report was sympathetic to franchisee desires
to sell the franchise as an on-going business including good will, Ozanne and Hunt recog-
nized that franchisors owed a duty to themselves and to the other franchises in the system to
prevent poor prospects from buying franchised units. They questioned whether any legisla-
tion could protect the franchisee's right to sell and at the same time force the franchisor to
deal in good faith in approving the sale of the franchise. Id. at 273.
" Id. at 273-74. The majority of franchisors responded that their franchisee's heirs in-
herited the franchise; 41.2% indicated that they did so with franchisor approval. Id. at 274.
Ozanne and Hunt commented that the right to inherit only with the franchisor's approval
is really "no right at all." Id. However, the same factors that necessitate franchisor approval
of potential buyers argue for franchisor approval of heirs.
I 2 Id. at 274.
' Id. at 275-76.
, Id. at 276.
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some franchisees may feel an implied threat of termination because
of the way franchise agreements "dwell on the franchisor's right to
terminate,"'"- the study revealed that only 12.9% of the franchisees
reported that their franchisors had "ever threatened to revoke their
franchise."' 8 It was not reported whether these threatened termi-
nations were for cause or how many franchisees actually were ter-
minated following such threats.
A 1977 study conducted by the Continental Franchise Review
attempted to gauge the prevalence of and reasons for nonrenewal 5 7
It was found that approximately ninety-one percent of all expired
franchise agreements were renewed. Of those agreements not re-
newed, 3.9% were not renewed at the choice of the franchisee, 2.9%
represented franchisee failure to meet contract provisions, and
1.9% resulted from poor franchisee performance.8 "'
Statistics reported in 1977 by the International Franchise As-
sociation also indicate the absence of widespread termination or
nonrenewal problems. 89 In Michigan, the annual rate of termina-
tion by franchisors was shown to be 1.4% of the total number of
franchised outlets of registered franchisors; 0.01% were not renewed
by franchisors. In Wisconsin, the annual rate of termination by
franchisors was shown to be 2.6% of the total number of franchised
outlets of registered franchisors; 0.18% were not renewed by
franchisors.50
According to the Commerce Department, in 1978, ninety-three
percent of the 15,373 non-traditional franchise arrangements which
came up for renewal were renewed. Of those not renewed, twenty-
three percent resulted from objections by the franchisor, forty-five
percent from the franchisee not wanting to renew, and thirty-two
percent from mutual agreement.'9 '
There were 5,969 terminations of non-traditional franchise
agreements in 1978, of which 1,748 were terminated by franchisors.
This was only 0.09% of the franchisee-owned establishments exist-
ing in 1978. One-thousand two-hundred and twelve were terminated
'I Id. Every franchise agreement examined by Ozanne and Hunt contained a termina-
tion clause.
't Id.
' Franchiser Trends, supra note 52, at 3.
,c Id. at 14. The industries in which poor performance resulted in nonrenewal were
predominantly automotive parts and service and campgrounds.
' See Mikva bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 344-46 (testimony of Philip F. Zeidman).
,9 Id. at 344-45.
FRANcHISING-1980, supra note 6, at 10-11.
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for non-payment of royalties or other financial obligations, 107 for
the franchisee's failure to comply with quality control standards,
and 429 for other reasons not identified. Franchisees terminated
3,069 franchise agreements while an additional 1,152 were termi-
nated by mutual consent. A total of 2,786 franchisees in 1978 asked
permission from their franchisors to sell their franchises to others;
all but 56 transfers were approved.'92
In sum, while some franchisees may believe that widespread
termination and nonrenewal problems exist, there is no evidence
to support the claim that franchisor abuses of termination and
nonrenewal powers are prevalent throughout franchising. Indeed,
the available evidence shows that franchise terminations are
exceedingly uncommon, which should not be surprising. Termi-
nations are expensive and time-consuming and almost inevitably
result in costly litigation. Few franchisors are able to afford in-
dulgence in arbitrary or capricious termination or non-renewal. 3
Moreover, any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal terminations or
nonrenewals which might occur may be redressed by existing
remedies. Legislation has been passed to correct abuses in indus-
tries where abuses have been shown to be widespread.'94 As dis-
cussed above, the antitrust laws provide strong incentives to en-
courage litigation of antitrust violations.'95
"I2 Id. at 11. The Commerce Department did not give the number of franchise agree-
ments existing in 1978. It is assumed that for each franchised establishment there is a sepa-
rate franchise agreement. To the extent that franchise agreements govern more than one
establishment, the termination rate would be correspondingly higher.
" As stated in a 1971 Conference Board report on franchising,
the evidence does suggest that most franchisors could not afford to unreasonably
terminate very many of their franchise contracts. When a termination doesoccur,
it usually comes as the culmination of a series of attempts by the franchisor to get
the franchisee to operate in conformance with a contract stipulation.
Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 261 (testimony of Edward Kushell) (quoting Fran-
chise Distribution, CONF. BD. RaP. No. 523 (1971)). See also id. at 431-32 (statement of
John Hatch). As stated by Congressman Krueger: "Whim and caprice are seldom profitable,
and I suspect [franchisors] are more interested in profit than whimsy." Mikva Bill Hearings,
supra note 5, at 497.
"' See note 22 supra.
,9 See notes 169-173 and accompanying text supra. Accordingly, terminations and
nonrenewals that are shown to have resulted from franchisee resistance to illegal franchisor
activities such as price fixing, see, e.g.. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), unrea-
sonable territorial or customer restrictions, see, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), tying arrangements, see, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448
F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), unreasonable restrictive covenants,
see, e.g., American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975),
monopolization or attempts to monopolize, see., e.g. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp,
[Vol. 54:217
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Additionally, the common law of contracts protects franchisees
against termination or refusals to renew in retaliation for noncom-
pliance with illegally imposed obligations."'6 Some courts have gone
so far as to restrict the franchisor's right to terminate by using
other common-law principles or the Uniform Commercial Code.
Thus, for example, in Arnott v. American Oil Co.,"'7 the eighth cir-
cuit held that a "fiduciary relationship" existed between an oil
company (which the court held to be a franchisor) and its lessee
service station dealer (which it held to be a franchisee), and that
the oil company breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in
terminating its lease agreement with the dealer without good
cause. In Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello,18 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that public policy prohibited a petroleum company
franchisor from terminating its service station franchisee except for
good cause, which the court defined as failure by the franchisee
substantially to comply with its obligations under the franchise
agreement."' Similarly, in Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue,0"" the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that section 2-302 of
the Uniform Commercial Code prohibited as "unconscionable" on
its face a contract provision that granted a franchisor the unilateral
right to terminate upon 10 days' notice following a determination
by the franchisor that the franchisee has impaired the quality or
reputation of the franchise product. "' While many of the difficul-
ties discussed later in this paper about the ability of the courts
successfully to interfere with commercial contractual relationships
may arise by resort to common-law or UCC principles, at least' the
courts would do so presumably only after a thorough analysis of the
particular fact situation presented.
[1977] 1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 61,529 (S.D. Ind. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 606
F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), can be redressed under the antitrust laws, which permit the recov-
ery of treble damages and attorney fees.
"' See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 284-85 (testimony of Philip F. Zeidman).
19 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979). Judge Bright strongly dissented from the holding that
the relationship between the parties was one between franchisor and franchisee rather than
between commercial lessor and lessee, and from the court's dictum that "[inherent in a
franchise relationship is a fiduciary duty." Id. at 890 (Bright, J., dissenting).
"' 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); accord, Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736 (1978).
' 63 N.J. at 410-11, 307 A.2d at 603.
223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
=' Id. at 440.
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D. Conclusions
A disparity of bargaining power between franchisor and fran-
chisee, while not always as great as claimed by proponents of legis-
lation regulating the franchise relationship, nonetheless may exist
in some cases. The disparity may result from the franchisor's
greater experience and its controls over the franchisee's operations.
But these controls are necessary to ensure the maintenance of uni-
form standards of quality throughout the franchise system, to pro-
tect the franchisor's trademark, and to enable the franchisor effec-
tively to assist the franchisee in opening and operating the
franchised unit. These, of course, are the very benefits franchisees
seek and pay for when purchasing a franchise. Full and fair disclo-
sure would permit prospective franchisees to understand and
accept or reject the necessity of franchisor controls and would
result in fewer unrealistic franchisee expectations.
VI. THE OVERREACTION TO THE OVERPROMOTION OF FRANCHISING
Despite the lack of evidence supporting claims of widespread
franchisor abuses other than those associated with the overpromo-
tion of franchising, fifteen states have passed legislation regulating
the franchise relationship.' 2 The statutes generally prohibit a
franchisor from requiring "unreasonable" standards of franchise
performance and require the franchisor to demonstrate "good
cause?' for termination or nonrenewal.0 3 At the national level, the
"Franchise Reform Act," ' 4 introduced by former Congressman
Mikva, would seek to substitute government regulation of termi-
2 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-807 to -818 (1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42.133f (Supp. 1978);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2551-2556 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 482E-6 (Supp. 1978); ILL.
Pub. Act No. 81-0417 (effective Jan. 1, 1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-2.7-1 to 7.7 (Burns
Supp. 1979); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 445.1501-.1545 (Supp. 1979-1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
80C.14 (Supp. 1979); Miss. CorE ANN. §§ 75-25-51 to 75-24-61 (Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 407.400-.410, .420 (Vernon 1979); [19781 Neb. Laws, Legis. Bill No. 202 (eff. April 5,
1978); N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -15 (West Supp. 1979-1980); VA. CODE § 13.1-564 (1978
& Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.100.180, .190 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 135.01-
.07 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979-1980). See also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§ 278-278d (1976 &
Supp. 1978).
"3 See notes 3-4 supra. In 1978, the California Department of Corporations, the agency
that administers the California Franchise Investment Law, promoted legislation instituting
a new form of regulation to tie in with its disclosure law. This new form of regulation is
derived from state "blue sky" laws and employs what is commonly referred to as the "fair,
just and equitable" standard. This legislation would extend significantly the reach of the
state's regulatory arm into the substantive provisions of the franchise agreement. The legis-
lation failed to emerge from committee. See FRANCHISING-1979, supra note 6, at 21-24.
201 Mikva Bill, supra note 2.
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nation and nonrenewal for private agreement between franchisor
and franchisee.
The Mikva Bill would prohibit the franchisor from terminating
the franchise agreement unless the franchisor has "good cause" for
terminating"5 or effects a "marketing area withdrawal."2 " To
demonstrate good cause, a franchisor would be required to prove
that the termination was based upon the "continued" failure by
the franchisee, without "reasonable" excuse or justification, to
comply "substantially" with an "essential" and "reasonable"
franchisor requirement imposed "under the terms of the
franchise. ' 2 7 Good cause could also be shown if the franchisor
proves that the termination was based upon the franchisee's con-
tinued "bad faith" conduct or "unjustified" and "unreasonable"
failure to carry out the terms of the franchise agreement.0 8
At the expiration of the franchise agreement, the franchisor
would be required to enter into a new agreement with the fran-
chisee,0 9 unless the franchisor is able to prove one of several items:
that it was effecting a "marketing area withdrawal, '"2 10 that it had
permitted the sale of the franchise to a franchisor-approved third
party, 2 1 or that it had paid the franchisee "reasonable" compensa-
tion for the loss of value, including goodwill, of the franchisee's
business attributable to the franchisor's failure to renew.2 2 In the
event no agreement is reached, "reasonable" compensation is to be
determined by binding arbitration .2 1 Finally, before terminating
the agreement or refusing to renew, the franchisor must provide the
franchisee with at least a 90-day notice of its intention, unless
shorter notice is required to protect against an imminent danger to
public health or safety, or in the cases of franchisee bankruptcy,
insolvency, or voluntary abandonment.2 1
Legislation regulating franchising has not fared well in Con-
gress; to date, the Mikva Bill has not even been reported out of
committee. The failure of broad franchising legislation to become
= Id. § 5(2).
lMId. § 5(1).
= Id. § 3(3)(A).
Id. § 3(3)(B).
2" Id. § 6(a).
210 Id. § 6(a)(1).
m Id. § 6(a)(2)(A).
2 Id. § 6(a)(2)(B).
213 Id. § 6(b).
21 Id. § 4(b).
19801
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
law at the national level is largely attributable to its proponents'
inability to demonstrate that the legislation is necessary or wise.
The real impetus for legislation regulating the franchise rela-
tionship is apparent. When some franchisees mature and become
successful, they tend to attribute their success not to the
franchisor's efforts but almost solely to their own.21 5 At this point,
they may begin to tinker with the franchise operation, believing
they can do it better their way.16 Moreover, as time passes, the
original value of the franchise and the franchisor's services may
become less appreciated, especially when the franchisor has pro-
vided only initial expertise and the trademark.217 Some franchisees
may therefore begrudge the franchisor's continuing controls and
financial return. This attitude, of course, often results in violations
of the franchise agreement and consequent termination or non-
renewal.
It is not surprising, therefore, that some franchisees have
attempted to insulate themselves from the consequences of their
deviations from the agreed upon terms of the franchise agreement
by seeking legislation regulating the franchise relationship. While
perhaps understandable, these efforts should be recognized for
what they are: attempts to foster personal economic interests.
VII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF OVERKILL
The consequences of overkill in the form of overly restrictive
governmental regulation of franchising could well be quite serious:
it could set the franchisor against the franchisee, thus undermining
the mutuality of effort necessary to the franchise operation; cause a
further overburdening of the legal system; and interfere with the
successful allocation of goods and services in the American econ-
omy through the means of the private commercial contract.
A. The Undermining of the Franchise Relationship
Successful franchising depends upon continued cooperation be-
tween franchisor and franchisees to maintain uniform standards of
quality throughout the franchise system.218 While deceptively sim-
ple and superficially appealing, legislation prohibiting "unreasona-
215 See Burck, supra note 7, at 152; Bernstein, supra note 50, at 36.
216 See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 648-49 (submission of E.E. Faber);
Koach, The Mikva bill is Dead, FOOD SERVICE MARKEtING, Aug. 1978, at 28, 30.
SI? See Oxenfeldt & Thompson, supra note 54, at 8.
2lx See Axelrad, supra note 11, at 697.
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ble" standards of performance and permitting termination of the
franchise agreement only for "good cause" introduces undesirable
elements of uncertainty and subjectivity into the franchise rela-
tionship. For example, a court interpreting the terms "unreasona-
ble" and "good cause" could adopt general community standards
instead of the franchisor's higher standards of quality deemed es-
sential to customer satisfaction. 29 As discussed earlier, when cus-
tomer expectations regarding uniform quality go unfulfilled, the
value of the trademark is eroded and consequently the entire
franchise system will suffer.121
Moreover, vague terms such as "unreasonable" and "good
cause" invite litigation to determine their content, for the fran-
chisee will be left with no univocal standards upon which to rely.
To the extent that franchisees believe termination to be -overly dif-
ficult regardless of performance, they would have less of an incen-
tive to be conscientious. The net effect of legislation regulating the
franchise relationship will be to substitute an adversary relation-
ship for one of mutual cooperation, thus undermining franchising
as a successful method of doing business. 2 '
The "good cause" requirement is perhaps even more objection-
able when applied to nonrenewal. It is clearly anticompetitive to
force a franchisor to renew an undesirable franchisee at the end of
the franchise term.2 2 Ultimately, consumers would have to pay the
price for poor franchisee performance. Moreover, the proposed leg-
islation might have significant inflationary effects, in that it would
protect subpar franchisees from the competition that brings lower
prices.22
11 See Regulation of Franchising, supra note 11, at 1046-47; Mikva Bill Hearings, supra
note 5, at 172-74 (statement of Norman D. Axelrad).
"I See note 167 and accompanying text supra.
221 As stated by then Deputy Assistant Attorney General Joe Sims on behalf of the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice:
[W]e have some doubts as to the likely effectiveness of the [Mikva] bill in re-
dressing problems of unequal bargaining power between franchisors and franchis-
ees. These problems are exacerbated by the vague standards employed by the leg-
islation which would encourage litigation whenever a franchise is terminated or
not renewed.
..[Tihe bill would undoubtedly foster extensive litigation and undermine
the certainty necessary for informed fiargaining between franchisors and
franchisees.
Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 47. See also id. at 215 (statement of Donald J. Loss);
id. at 532-33 (statement of James D. McKevitt).
2I Id. at 47-49 (statement of Joe Sims); id. at 301-08 (statement of Philip F. Zeidman).
m Id. at 104-05, 300 (statement of Philip F. Zeidman); id. at 593 (statement of E. Bruce
Butler).
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Legislation making the franchise relationship virtually perpet-
ual inevitably would encourage some franchisors to repurchase
franchised outlets, look more favorably at other forms of doing
business including vertical integration, or limit franchisees to large,
well-established businessmen."4 The legislation would also deter
small prospective franchisors from using the franchise method of
doing business.125 The Supreme Court has recognized this effect:
To the extent that [a legal restriction] prevents a firm from using
the franchise system to achieve efficiencies that it perceives as im-
portant to its successful operation, [it] creates an incentive for
vertical integration into the distribution system, thereby eliminat-
ing to that extent the role of independent businessmen. 26
In sum, the overregulatiorn of franchising might well unduly
burden existing franchisors and deter prospective franchisors,
thereby reducing and perhaps destroying the real benefits of
franchising to society, the franchisor, and the franchisee. Former
Securities and Exchange Commissioner Roberta S. Karmel's com-
ments are particularly apt:
Much regulatory legislation was intended to provide the public,
and especially consumers, with protection .against perceived ills.
In many instances we must reassess not only the efficiency of that
protection, but also whether the economic, legal and social bur-
dens of maintaining the legislative insurance are worth such pro-
tection. All regulation is costly, not only because it is paid for by
taxation, but also because it interferes with market forces, in-
creases the size and complexity of government, and favors one
group of people in our society over another. In many instances the
favored group needs special consideration or protection. But often,
the claims of the protected are no better than the claims of the
regulated.1
B. The Overburdening of the Legal System
As discussed above, vague, overbroad legislation regulating the
' See, e.g., Hunt-1973, supra note 49, at 26; Kamenshine, supra note 98, at 219-20;
Axelrad, supra note 11, at 718; Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 222 (statement of
Donald J. Loss).
22 See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 56 (statement of Joe Sims); id. at 197-98
(letter from Norman D. Axelrad); Hunt supra note 45, at 82.
' Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.26 (1977).
22? Karmel, A Skeptical Regulator Looks at the Future of Regulation, Remarks to the
Women's Economic Club, Detroit, Mich., Nov. 20, 1978, at 6.
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franchise relationship would inevitably engender a large volume of
litigation, thus further burdening an already overburdened judicial
system. Courts would become enmeshed in reviewing routine busi-
ness decisions. Under the terms of proposed legislation, franchisees
would have everything to gain and very little to lose through litiga-
tion.", This is unfortunate, for legal rights should bear at least
some relationship to legal resources. Most unfortunate of all,
though, is that franchisees and, ultimately, consumers will be bur-
dened with the costs of litigation generated by legislation regulat-
ing the franchise relationship.2 9
Legislation regulating the franchise relationship is most
2 See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 49, 51 (statement of Joe Sims); id. at 333
(statement of Philip F. Zeidman).
2 The implications of the proposed legislation for our judicial system may be illus-
trated by a hypothetical case. Assume that a fast food franchisor, recognizing the dramatic
increases in consumer demand for frozen yogurt, decides to expand its existing menus to
meet this new demand under a franchise agreement that gives complete menu control to the
franchisor. An individual franchisee who has been successful selling the old menu unilater-
ally decides that frozen yogurt would not be successful in his market and refuses to go along
with the change. After repeated warnings from the franchisor and following extensive discus-
sions, this franchisee is terminated for failing to institute the required menu change. Under
the proposed legislation, the franchisor will be required to show that this franchisee was
terminated for "good cause." Mikva Bill, supra note 2, § 5. "Good cause" is defined to mean:
a termination by a franchisor which is based upon (a) continued failure by the
franchisee, without reasonable excuse or justification, to comply substantially with
an essential and reasonable requirement imposed by the franchisor under the
terms of the franchise; or (b) continued bad-faith conduct or unjustified and un-
reasonable failure to act by the franchisee with respect to the carrying out of the
terms of such franchise.
Id. § 3(3).
Suppose the franchisee can show that the expected increase in profit from adding frozen
yogurt would be minimal (but still important from the viewpoint of the franchisor), and
claims that he did not want to incur the costs of instituting the menu change. Or suppose
the franchisee subsequently can show that the franchisor was mistaken, that frozen yogurt
turned out to be a fad and that the profits of both the franchisor and the other franchisees
did not increase as a result of the change. Or suppose the franchisee can show that for some
reason his customers did not want frozen yogurt, while admitting that the system's franchis-
ees as a whole will realize increased profits as a result of the change. Or, finally, suppose the
franchisor decided to discontinue frozen yogurt, and it was the franchisee who insisted upon
selling the product.
On any of these assumptions has the franchisor established "good cause" within the
meaning of the Mikva Bill? The Mikva Bill's partial definition of "good cause" as a fran-
chisee's continued failure, without justification, to comply substantially with an essential
and reasonable requirement imposed by the franchisor merely restates the problem in new
words, leaving unanswered two questions: whether the complained-of requirement must be
essential and reasonable to the interests of the franchisor, the franchisees in toto, or the
individual, terminated franchisee; and whether an individual franchisee would be excused or
justified in failing to comply with a provision of a franchise agreement merely because com-
pliance would not benefit the franchisees in toto or him individually.
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seriously defective when it contains no meaningful definition of
"good cause" and is silent on the question of whose "good cause"
must be established before a franchisor may terminate a franchise.
In any event, it would appear to be beyond the ordinary institu-
tional competence of a court to "balance" (if this is what the "good
cause" standard requires) the long- and short-term interests of one
franchisee (or group of franchisees) against the long- and short-
term interests of the other franchisees and the franchisor, including
the franchisor's shareholders. Put most generally, a court may not
always know how to go about allocating the risk that the benefits of
any necessarily uniform change in the franchised product or format
will be unevenly distributed among the various interests. 20 But the
court would be obligated to try to do so, and the Bar would scram-
ble to assist it, and ultimately-undoubtedly after considerable de-
lay2'1-the quasi-feudal "status"' z of "franchisee" might be deter-
mined, however at variance with the terms of the franchise
contract.
211 Cf. Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir.
1940) (oral contract not to cancel existing automobile dealership except for "just and proper
cause" void for vagueness). On the institutional limits of adjudication, see Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 367, 394-404 (1978), which restates
certain ideas first published by Professor Fuller. See Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of
Law, in Paoc. OF AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 1-8 (1960). See also L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW
172-73 (1968).
2' Recent experience under the California Automobile Franchise Act, CAL. VEH. CODE
ANN. §§ 3000-3010 (West Supp. 1979), suggests that, if enacted, the Mikva Bill is likely to be
used by franchisees principally as a means of delaying the termination of their franchise,
allowing them, in the interim, to obtain the benefits of continued participation in the
franchise system without having to conform to the uniform practices observed by the other
franchisees. See text following notes 14 supra and 256 infra. The California Automobile
Franchise Act affords existing automobile franchisees a right to a hearing to determine
whether there is "good cause" to distribute like-make cars within an existing market area.
The filing of a protest by an existing franchisee automatically enjoins the franchisor from
establishing a new franchise. In a recent case upholding certain procedural provisions of the
Act, New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978), appellants asserted,
apparently without challenge, that of the 117 protests filed by existing franchisees since the
effective date of the Act (July 1, 1974), only 42 had gone on to a hearing on the merits, and
of those only one had ultimately been sustained. Id. at 103. These facts led Justice Stevens,
in dissent, to observe that the real effect, and perhaps purpose, of the statute was to give
existing franchisees "the unqualified entitlement to an order that is tantamount to a prelim-
inary injunction absolutely prohibiting the opening of the new dealership until after the rela-
tively meaningless hearing has been completed." Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
m See Brown & Cohen, Franchise Misuse, 48 NOTRE DAME LAw, 1145, 1146 (1963);
Brown, supra note 98, at 111. On the movement back from "contract" to "status," see
Pound, The New Feudalism, 16 A.B.A.J. 553 (1930).
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C. The Impairment of Freedom to Contract
Freedom to contract is the concept by which the state has ac-
knowledged its limited institutional competence to resolve all the
affairs of everyday commercial life.m Today, more than ever, there
is widespread agreement that the government ought to refrain, as
much as possible, from regulating the private affairs of merchants
and others.24 Freedom to contract, which includes the right of pri-
vate citizens to invoke the sanction of the law to enforce their pri-
vate agreements,25 represents an important source of our economic
strength and perhaps an essential safeguard of our political free-
dom.26 Of course, it is recognized that freedom to contract is not
absolute and that legislative protection might be appropriate
within a particular industry where conditions are such that one of
the contracting parties has no freedom of choice in deciding
whether to enter into the contract.
Freedom to contract has also been one means by which com-
peting merchants have satisfied the constantly changing desires of
independent consumers. 237 Subject to the binding obligations of ex-
isting contracts and the antitrust laws, freedom to contract tradi-
tionally has protected the right of merchants and others to enter
and leave the marketplace at will.?5 As noted, franchising's success
is dependent upon consumer identification of the franchisor's
trademark with uniform goods or services, and this identification
may be assured only by the franchisees' voluntary agreement to re-
linquish a certain amount of freedom of action to the franchisor in
accepting the franchisor's controls.s In view of the availability of a
2 A classic formulation of the office of freedom to contract in a free-market economy is
found in M. WEBER, LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 100-50 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954). An im-
portant restatement of these ideas in the American context is represented in Kessler, Con-
tracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629
(1943). See also F. KESSLER & G. GILMoRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 3 & n.7 (2d
ed. 1970); L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 113-15 (1968).
m See, e.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1979)); S. 710, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) (proposed bill to deregulate motor carriers).
21 See note 229 supra.
On the political implications of the freedom to contract, see F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM 72-87 (1944).
2 For example, if the demand for natural fibers declines, clothing suppliers have been
free not to renew their existing contracts with cotton growers and free to enter into new
contracts with manufacturers of synthetic fibers.
2 See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901); Constitutional
Obstacles, supra note 13, at 1499.
21 See text following note 14 supra.
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great number of related marketing opportunities and given full dis-
closure, the willingness of an independent merchant to enter into a
franchise agreement is a good indication that, at least initially, he
understands that his acceptance of the franchisor's controls is the
price of obtaining the benefits of uniformity.240
With time, however, the franchisee may believe that he can
increase the profitability of his own individual franchise by deviat-
ing from the franchisor's product line or by failing to adhere to the
franchisor's marketing and operations plan. It may be true that the
success of a franchise system might not be affected greatly by any
individual franchisee's "immaterial" or "unsubstantial" deviations
from the product line or the marketing and operations plan, just as
the solidarity of a union might not be affected greatly by the re-
fusal of any one union member to pay his dues. Unfortunately, the
very reason that leads the first franchisee to attempt to increase
his individual profits eventually tempts the remaining franchisees
to deviate from the product line or the marketing and operations
plan. The result in franchising, like the result in the field of labor
relations, is the destruction of uniformity throughout the franchise
system and therefore of the system's accumulated goodwill and
of the centralized decisionmaking capacity that gives franchising
significant advantages over other ways of doing business. 24'
The proposed legislation would deny to the franchisor and to
the other franchisees, the right to enforce the bargained-for uni-
formity of the franchised products or services and the right to ter-
minate franchisees who refuse to abide by the terms of the same
franchise agreement they expect to be enforced against others.Y2 In
24 The U.C.C. recognizes that a contract is not unconscionable merely because one
party restricts his future action in the expectation of short-term gain. See generally U.C.C. §
2-302 (1978) (unconscionability). "The basic test is whether, in the light of the general com-
mercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract. . . . The principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise . . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power." Id., Official Comment 1 (emphasis added); see Sinkoff Beverage Co. v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1966).
211 See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 66-97 (1971).
212 At present, a franchisor may terminate a franchisee who fails to comply fully (and
not merely substantially) with the terms of the franchise agreement. See Buyers & Traders
Service, Inc. v. Car Maintenance Specialists, Inc., 290 S.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. La. 1974);
Cycleway, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 77 Misc. 2d 829, 832, 354 N.Y.S.2d 812, 816 (Sup.
Ct. Oneida County 1974) ("the law of this state [is] that where the parties have agreed to a
termination clause, it must be enforced as written"). But see Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63
N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974) (implied covenant in
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doing so, the proposed legislation would, ironically, also deny the
individual franchisee the freedom to contract for the uniformity
throughout the franchise system upon which the long-term success
of his own franchise depends.2"3
The proposed legislation would have a far reaching effect upon
the underlying principles of freedom to contract and upon the salu-
tary effect this freedom has had upon our political system. Two
essential principles may be said to underlie freedom to contract.
First, freedom to contract necessarily implies freedom to restrict
one's future actions and the right to restrict others' future ac-
tions.2" Presumably, franchisees, like other merchants, enter into
contracts that limit their future actions with the expectation that
this loss of freedom will more than be made up for by the right
they have gained to restrict the future actions of the franchisor and
the other franchisees.2 5
Second, freedom to contract is based upon the fundamental
assumption that the ongoing distribution of goods and services in
the marketplace ordinarily involves a network of complex interests
and claims that cannot be resolved adequately by either legislative
command or judicial decision. 26 Accordingly, the state has tradi-
tionally authorized merchants and others to resolve their differ-
ences privately,247 and courts have long refused to rewrite the terms
of a contract in which the parties have themselves allocated the
risk of changed circumstances. 28
To insist upon freedom to contract in the mercantile setting of
a franchise system is not to ignore the existence of so-called con-
tracts of adhesion.2 9 The uniformity imposed by the franchise
franchise agreement bars termination where there has been substantial compliance). The
Mikva bill would substitute a regime of "substantial compliance," "reasonable excuse" and
"justification" for the principle of full compliance. Mikva Bill, supra note 2, § 3(3)(A),
(B). See note 229 supra.
2U See note 86 supra.
21 Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1943). Hale
provides an interesting and provacative discussion of the role of forbearance in contract law.
245 See text accompanying note 235 supra. See also Hewitt, supra note 85, at 233-34.
248 See notes 226-229 supra. See also V. J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ch.
XI, § 5 (D. Winch ed. 1970).
"' See note 231 supra.
' See 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACrS § 541 (1960), and cases cited therein.
2" Typical of contracts of adhesion are insurance policies, which have long been recog-
nized as departing from the principle of freedom to contract because insurers seek to obtain
uniform agreements from a wide range of persons whose life-chances may differ greatly, and
because the only alternative to one insurer's uniform terms is the uniform terms of another
insurer. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 631-35 (1943).
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agreement differs in important ways from the uniformity imposed
by the typical contract of adhesion. First, uniformity is the essence
of franchising, not simply an administrative convenience. Second,
in virtually every market there are actively competing alternatives
to franchising. Most franchisees who do not want to bear the costs
(and reap the related benefits) of uniformity are free to enter the
market on their own.
Nor does insistence upon freedom to contract in a commercial
setting argue against the now widely accepted restrictions upon the
freedom of workers,250 tenants,2sl and consumers25 2 to contract in a
marketplace in which they are prevented by market forces from in-
dependent decisionmaking. That society now protects people from
having the necessities of life exploited does not mean that freedom
to contract has been rendered irrelevant. In contrast to the restric-
tions upon freedom to contract regarding necessities of life, freedom
to contract among merchants has not been thought to require the
law's intrusive solicitude. 213 So long as there was in fact an in-
formed "meeting of the minds," commercial agreements have been
enforced according to their terms. The doctrines of adhesion, mis-
take, duress, unconscionability, waiver, estoppel and plain old-
fashioned fraud have served to police the actual freedom of the par-
ties to contract or not contract on agreed-upon terms.254
21 The child labor laws, minimum wage and hour laws, and the laws governing collec-
tive bargaining are all examples of the now well-recognized restrictions upon employment
contracts. On the implications of collective bargaining agreements for freedom of contract,
see Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 467 (1964). On the history of earlier restrictions upon freedom to contract, see
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909); Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 365 (1921).
2' Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970) (implied warranty of habitability).
22 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(unconscionable consumer credit contract unenforceable).
20 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1978) (exception to statute of frauds applicable to agree-
ments between merchants); id. § 2-205 (written offer by merchant to buy or sell goods not
revocable, for up to 3 months, for lack of consideration); id. § 2-207 (special rules govern
construction of additional terms in acceptance or confirmation between merchants); id. § 2-
209 (except as between merchants, agreement excluding modification or recission of contract
must be separately signed by other party); id. § 2-719 (limitation of consequential damages
for personal injury in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable, but limita-
tion of damages where loss is commercial is not).
" See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (refusal to enf6rce
contract determined to be unconscionably one-sided); Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684
(D.C. Cir. 1948) (damages awarded where one party had, in bad faith, induced other party
to expend money in expectation of a contract with unconscionable price); Helene Curtis
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 774 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (damages awarded due to failure of
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On this view of contracts, a merchant has the right to refuse to
enter into a contract unless the other party enforceably agrees to
perform his part of the bargain (not just most of the bargain or the
part of the bargain that a future court finds "reasonable") 5 and
the right to bargain for termination of the agreement if the other
party is in breach of the contract. Of course, both parties must be
fully informed of the possibility of termination and must have had
a fair opportunity to choose among competing contractors. But as-
suming that these conditions have been met, freedom to contract
traditionally has protected the right of a merchant to refuse to
enter into a contract and to enforce the contract he does enter into
according to its terms.26
Legislation regulating the franchise relationship would do
away with both of these rights, introducing long-abandoned, quasi-
feudal status relations into the commercial world. Freedom to con-
tract, in which is subsumed freedom to terminate a contract if the
other party refuses to abide by its agreed-upon terms, would be
transformed into a status relation of indefinite duration. Commer-
cial relations entered into in order to take advantage of temporary
market conditions would ripen by prescription into a unilateral
right to enjoy the benefits of a contract only so long as the contract
remained profitable. This trend might be accelerated by our legal
system's inability meaningfully to define "good cause" and the sys-
tem's ability to create status relationships. While the constantly
changing desires of independent consumers move in new directions,
the franchisor and the franchisee, the manufacturer and the whole-
saler, and more generally, the buyer and the seller, would be frozen
in place, unable to terminate existing agreements except for some
undefined "good cause," and unable to meet the new demands of
consumers.
Recent years have seen the introduction of judicial and legisla-
tive measures to protect consumers from the disproportionate infor-
mation and market power that some merchants may enjoy in cer-
one party fully to apprise other party of requirements to be fulfilled under contract); Sher-
wood v. Alker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887) (sales contract rescinded on ground that the
parties had made a mutual mistake as to composition of the goods contracted for); Obde v.
Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960) (vendor fraudulently concealed facts
about goods sold). See generally Gellhorn, supra note 24, at 475, 478-95.
"1 See note 238 supra. See also Jacobs & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 241, 129
N.E. 889, 890 (1921) (per Cardozo, J.) ("The courts never say that one who makes a contract
fills the measure of his duty by less than full performance.").
2 ' Id.; see Rubin, supra note 14, at 232.
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tain situations. 57 In attacking the central core of freedom to
contract, however, legislation regulating the franchise relationship
fatefully signals the introduction into our legal order the revolu-
tionary and ominously paternalistic notion that even merchants do
not know, and cannot be trusted to determine, what is in their own
best economic interests.58
VIII. THE BALANCED APPROACH
Full and fair disclosure, together with the enforcement of ex-
isting remedies and remedial legislation where necessary to correct
specific, proven abuses in those industries in which they might oc-
cur, is sufficient to eliminate franchising's principal problems. A
more fundamental solution to franchising's problems, however, is
the development and preservation of a healthy franchise relation-
ship evincing mutual respect and interdependence between
franchisor and franchisee. In a healthy relationship, franchisor and
franchisee alike strive to attain a common goal: the success of the
franchise system and the resultant benefits to both.
There are many paths to a healthy franchise relationship. In
many franchise systems, both franchisor and franchisee make a
significant financial commitment bonding their mutuality of inter-
est. As discussed earlier, franchise agreements in most industries
are for 10 years or lnger, allowing both franchisor and franchisee
an ample opportunity to recoup their investments. But the single
most important way to achieve a healthy franchise relationship is'
through continuous communication between franchisor and fran-
chisee to ensure high franchisee motivation-the key to successful
franchising. Achievement of a healthy franchise relationship elimi-
nates the need to use the highly undesirable business practice of
termination. If problems do arise during the franchise relationship,
and in almost every human relationship problems do arise, they are
most effectively resolved by the mutual efforts of a franchisor and a
franchisee seeking a common goal.
25 See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1976); U.C.C. §
9-206(1) (1978); Uniform Consumer Credit Code of 1974, 7 U.L.A. 583 (1978).
As stated by one commentator:
[Ilt is difficult to see why the courts would want to interfere at all in the fran-
chisee-franchisor relationship. What is involved here is a general freedom-of-con-
tract issue. Arguments which rely on the ignorance of the franchisee or the bar-
gaining power of the franchisor are as valid here as in any other context (which is
to say, not very valid).
Rubin, supra note 14, at 232 (footnote omitted).
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REGULATING FRANCHISES
Legislation that would upset the delicate balance of the
franchise relationship of course strikes at the very heart of franchis-
ing. When a problem arises, instead of seeking the cooperation of a
highly motivated franchisee, the franchisor may be forced by this
legislation to give a formal notice of default, lest legal rights be
lost. At this point, a healthy relationship is destroyed and an ad-
versary relationship substituted for it. The parties are thus forced
to concentrate on preserving legal rights rather than resolving mu-
tual problems.
If efforts at franchise motivation fail and termination is neces-
sary, in ordinary circumstances the franchisor should not repur-
chase the franchise for company operation. Repurchasing at this
point only invites franchisee claims that termination was effected
in order to take over the franchise. Instead, the franchisor should
attempt to arrange for the sale of the business to a mutually ac-
ceptable third party.
Although terminations are relatively infrequent, the power to
terminate is essential to enable the franchisor to maintain uniform
standards of quality throughout the franchise system and to pro-
tect its reputation and trademark. Moreover, a substandard fran-
chisee harms not only its own reputation but also the reputations
of all other franchisees within the system. A successful franchise
system's customers expect to find uniformly high levels of quality
in any franchised establishment they patronize. Franchisors need
the ability to protect the system by terminating those who fail to
meet these expectations.
Legislation which assumes, in direct contradiction of the facts,
that all franchisors seek to exploit their business relationships with
their franchisees is a discredit to the vast majority of franchisors
who operate ethically and in the mutual interest of their franchis-
ees and themselves. More important, this legislation threatens
the ability of most franchisors to conduct their business with the
flexibility necessary to deal promptly with the small percentage of
misguided or unmotivated franchisees.
Given a sufficiently long duration of the franchise agreement to
enable franchisees to recoup their investment, nonrenewal
problems can largely be resolved through early notice. In cases
where franchisees do not qualify for renewal because of failure to
meet the franchisor's standards of performance, franchisors should
notify them well in advance, the exact time depending upon the
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nature of the business and the reasons for nonrenewal.255
Legislation that would force franchisors to renew a franchise
would deprive a franchisor of the ability to choose the people who
will operate within its system. More significant, however, it
would encourage present and prospective users of the franchise
method of doing business to look more favorably at other methods
of doing business. Some prospective franchisors desirous of issuing
long-term franchises will be most hesitant to enter franchising at
all if the franchise, once issued, becomes perpetual.
Legislation regulating the franchise relationship should be
limited to addressing specific, proven abuses within a particular
industry. Legislation that would regulate the franchise relationship
without taking into account such critical factors as the nature and
practices of the industry to be regulated, the length of the franchise
agreement, the capital investments of both franchisor and fran-
chisee, and the extent of franchisor controls necessary to preserve
uniform quality standards is legislative overkill.
2 °
Despite its very real problems, franchising is a strong and
growing way of doing business. The fundamental problem in
franchising-overpromotion by some franchisors-reflects more on
some of the promoters rather than on the franchising concept. When
franchising failed to live up to the unreasonable standards set for it
by the overpromoters, its problems became magnified through the
microscope of franchisee disappointment. Disclosure rules and
practices can be improved, and franchisees in certain industries may
need additional legislative protection. But legislation regulating the
franchise relationship in all industries is neither necessary nor wise.
It would be most unfortunate if franchising as a way of doing
business were crippled or destroyed and its benefits lost because of
an overreaction to the overpromotion of franchising.
21 McDonald's policy with respect to renewal or "rewrites" of franchise agreements is
set forth in Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 194-96 (exhibit C to statement of Norman
D. Axelrad). In instances where franchisees do not qualify for rewritten agreements, it is
McDonald's policy to notify the franchisee 3 years in advance so that they can have ample
time to locate a buyer for the business. In all situations where a franchisee is deemed not
qualified for a rewrite, he or she will be given the opportunity to sell the franchise at fair
market value to a new qualified buyer acceptable to McDonald's, and McDonald's will im-
mediately agree to grant a new term franchise to this buyer. Under no circumstances will
McDonald's operate any McDonald's restaurants that are not rewritten.
260 See Mikva Bill Hearings, supra note 5, at 54 (statement of Joe Sims).
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